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Abstract 
In Book I part IV of the Treatise of Human Nature David Hume argues that it is 
impossible to have an idea of ourselves enduring the same through time. We 
experience many and varying transient impressions over the course of our lives 
and our ideas are ultimately derived from and enlivened by our impressions, he 
explains. Now, if an enduring idea requires an enduring impression and an 
enduring impression is impossible, an enduring idea of personal identity is 
likewise impossible. 
The implications are such that we can only ever know Hume's "self' as an 
historical entity and, at best, our knowledge can only ever be approximate, along 
the lines of" Jane is x type of person presently." Our judgements must therefore 
refer to varying instantiations of "self' rather than an enduring self. Assuming the 
authenticity and adequacy of judgements only hold so long as the judgement 
actually refers to the nature of the judged, judgement must prove superfluous and 
obsolete the moment one's identity changes. 
Hume does attempt to allow for judgement later in the Treatise, arguing moral 
judgements are grounded in the sympathetic emotional responses of pleasure and 
pain and are refined by taking account of some general and stable points of view. 
Accordingly, the moral point of view must call into operation at least one 
sentiment common to all (normal) persons, otherwise it would not succeed in 
bringing everybody's judgements into agreement. 
Given these considerations, I argue that (1) Hume's moral stance ultimately has 
its basis in our perceptions of another, insofar as it assumes that you or I can 
know what it is like to be that person. As such, it does not give us neutrality but 
rather a situated impartiality, and (2) Supposing our knowledge of another's 
nature can only ever be approximate and our judgements vague, the nature of 
Humean selves must necessarily elude comprehensive understanding, which 
leads me to (3) Selves can only ever be described on Hume's line, not judged. 
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Chapter 1: Introducing The Problem of Personal Identity 
It is sufficient if I can make the learned world apprehend that there is some 
difficulty in the case and that whoever solves the difficulty must say something 
very new and extraordinary - as new as the difficulty i~elf. 
1 
DavidHume 
-Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature 
The idea of questioning my identity didn't occur to me prior to my first year in 
university, where finding yourself, even at the bottom of a bottle, was what you 
were really pursuing. Like most questions, its answer initially seemed quite 
simple, and I felt foolish for having considered it being other than "Yes, I am the 
same person, have always been the same person." For the most part established 
and constant, "I" was knowable to myself and others. At least that was how it 
seemed at the time. But now it is more a statement of unabashed naivety than 
resolution, relying on my rationalization that at least one other scholar has urged 
"there is no conviction more profoundly felt ... than this of a self enduring through 
all the changes and events oflife. "1 
To be sure, each of us is always the same human individual, unique and 
distinguishable from others. That is not a matter of contention for me. Where my 
problem lies is in the assertion that each of us is always "the same thing, the same 
reality."2 I am not alone in thinking this is arguable if not false. 
1 Hendel, Charles W., Studies in the philosophy of David Hume (New York: Garland Pub, 1983), 200. 
2 Hartshorne, Charles, "Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest: A Metaphysics of Ethics," in Ethics (Vol. 84, 
No.3. (Apr., 1974)), 201. 
2 
In fact, many philosophers have taken issue with this claim, including the 
great Modernists Descartes, Malebranche, Locke and Hume. While each 
revolutionized the way that we think about personal identity, it is David Hume's 
theory that I find the most groundbreaking and contentious yet difficult to 
disprove, making it an obvious choice for the subject of this thesis. Before I get to 
Hume, however, I want to begin by framing the problem of personal identity 
more precisely, providing an historical context through which Hume's theory can 
be properly examined. 
Let's, then, begin with Descartes, who represented his entire system as the 
consequence of what he took to be an inevitable truth expressed in the 
proposition, cogito ergo sum- "I think therefore I am." Ever sceptical of the 
knowledge he could arrive at through his senses, Descartes realized at least one 
thing had to be true, namely that doubt existed and that a thinking subject had to 
be doing the doubting.3 Because he had affirmed that he was a thinking subject 
with clarity and distinction this item of knowledge held more truth to him than 
anything that could be perceived in the material world, which was filled with 
uncertainty. 4 
Picking up where Descartes left off, Malebranche pointed out that this 
"thinking I" or "self' would be rather barren and meaningless if only identified 
with the mere fact of consciousness. Perception and thought must be directed 
towards something in order for these capacities to yield anything meaningful, he 
3 Descartes, Rene, Excerpt from Meditations on the First Philosophy, in Modem Philosophy, 4th 
Edition, Vol. III, ed. Forrest E. Baird (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 23-25. 
4 Descartes, 24. 
3 
explained, for consciousness is simply a feeling or awareness accompanying 
knowledge of objects rather than a knowledge of self in its truest sense.s Granted, 
Descartes' theory does give us consciousness and knowledge of ourselves as 
thinking beings, but what we're really after, says Malebranche, is meaningful 
insight into our nature, and the direct inspection of consciousness alone does not 
allow for this. 6 
Locke also saw the need to make Descartes' original conclusion more 
robust. Upon consideration of what "person" represents, which Locke took to be a 
thinking, intelligent being, capable of reason and reflection, who can consider 
itself as itself, the same thing in different times and places,7 he realized (1) 
consciousness is inseparable from thinking and (2) by reflecting on our conscious 
existence we arrive at the idea of personal identity. PersollS are therefore not only 
subjects who can think, Descartes they can also be the objects of their thought. 
And then there was David Hume. Departing from traditional thinking in 
two main respects in his Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, Hume's theory (1) does away with the assumption that 
singular qualities can be taken to be instances of identity and (2) advances the 
idea that we have no grounds either in experience or in reason for declaring the 
self to be an unchanging, simple substance. 
5 Malebranche, Nicolas, The Search After Truth, ed. & trans. Thomas M. Lennon (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1997), 203-204. 
6 Malebranche, 205. 
7 Locke, John, Excerpt from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in Modern Philosophy (Fourth 
Edition, Vol. III), ed. Forrest E. Baird (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 210-213. 
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This project, while original in its own right, is hardly accidental within 
Hume's broader philosophy or divergent from his philosophical method. True to 
his empiricist conviction that all knowledge is arrived at through sensory 
perception, it is hardly surprising that Hume was sceptical about the nature of 
self, posing such questions as: Is self something that can be known empirically -
its nature inferred or deduced through sense impressions? If we can perceive self, 
can we have an idea of its nature that endures through time? 
To answer these questions Hume began by offering a theory of knowledge. 
For Hume, all knowledge is arrived at through the senses and comes to us in the 
form of impressions and ideas. Impressions are those sensations, passions and 
emotions as we first experience them, forcefully, vividly and unmediated by 
thought.s Though constantly changing in many respects, including subject-
matter, intensity, vividness and endurance, impressions nevertheless share the 
commonalities of resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause and effect. 9 
As for ideas, they are related to impressions inasmuch as they are their faint 
images involved in thinking and reasoning, having their origin in a prior 
impression.w 
Extending this thinking to personal identity, we see that in order to have 
an idea of self that endures the same through time we must experience a 
preceding uniform impression throughout the whole course of our lives. Where 
8 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton (Oxford: University 
Press, 2005), 1.1.1.1. 
9 Hume, 1.1.1 ,2. 
10 Hume, 1.1.1.5-6. 
impressions are incapable of persisting, an idea of personal identity that endures 
the same though time must be impossible. 
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This is precisely what Hume intends to show when he tells us that personal 
identity consists in nothing more than a long chain of simple impressions, more 
or less closely related and between which there are no real bonds: "a bundle or 
collection of different perceptions, which succeed one another with inconceivable 
rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. "11 It cannot be 
overemphasized that this account has radical implications for our understanding 
of self, pointing to the unsettling conclusion that we are mistaken in believing 
personal identity endures. 
Of course, as human beings we realize that we change physically and 
psychologically over time. Surely, I am not exactly the same person to 
appearance, having the same interests and desires that I did when I was, say, two 
years old. This is not a problematic or unintuitive concession. The clincher is that 
Hume is telling us we are, strictly speaking, different people from one moment to 
the next. 
If accurate, the puzzle that remains is a psychological one. What is it about 
human psychology that makes this mistaken belief in personal identity possible? 
Little peace of mind is afforded by Hume's explanation that: because the 
majority of our perceptions12 are causally related and resemble one another so 
closely, we tend to overlook their numerical diversity and ascribe identity to them 
11 Hume, 1.4.6.4. 
12 Note that at times Hume uses ''perceptions" and "impressions" interchangeably. 
when it does not exist. Says Hume, you will surely discover the intelligibility of a 
conception of self invariably existing, one and the same throughout all the 
changes in our perceptions, can only be traced to a natural pro pension of the 
human mind that is brought into play by certain features of the order of 
perceptions.13 If you consider philosophical attempts to justify our belief in 
identity, you will realize that they are either unintelligible or have no basis in the 
evidence of introspection, he explains.14 
This, then, is the Humean nature of self. It is a reality known to us only by 
virtue of resemblance amongst our perceptions and impressions; a unity and a 
permanent existence which we cannot refrain from conceiving because of the 
remarkably perfect causal relations through the life of mind.15 
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Having set up Hume's account of personal identity in this, my 
introduction, Chapter 2 will take up where this one leaves off. Specifically, I will 
continue to develop and examine Hume's theory of personal identity and evaluate 
it with reference to some of the more challenging criticisms it has faced, 
particularly those of Terence Penelhum, Jane L. Mcintyre and Barry Stroud. 
Briefly here, Penelhum focuses on and takes issue with the sharp 
distinction Hume draws between identity and difference, while Mcintyre and 
Stroud both take Hume's argument to presuppose and require the very idea of 
enduring self he is attempting to disprove. Perhaps too pointedly, it is my 
13 Hume, 1.4.6.16. 
14 Hume, 1.4.6.16. 
15 Hendel, 214-15. 
contention that none of these arguments successfully challenge or undermine 
Hume's theory, because the plausibility of each requires that they introduce their 
own preconceptions of the nature of mind and self into Hume's account (where 
they have no bearing on the argument at hand). 
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But this is not to suggest that Hume's theory of personal identity is free 
from or unthreatened by criticisms. Turning your attention to Chapter 3, with the 
help of William R. Carter, Harry Frankfurt, Richard Taylor, Peter van Inwagen 
and Randolph Clarke, I will examine Book II of the Treatise and the Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals wherein Hume's moral theory is expounded. 
Why am I concerned with Hume's moral theory?, you might ask. I am 
curious to see how a subject - a self that is always changing - can be evaluated. 
Perhaps this concern becomes most pronounced upon consideration of the 
question: Who can we hold responsible for a given action on Hume's line, and 
does it even make sense to do so? 
As you can see, my interest in Hume's theory of personal identity is in its 
epistemological and ethical implications, especially their meeting point in moral 
judgement. Too abrupt? Let me elaborate. 
Typically, we attempt to understand an action by tracing it back to its 
agent's motive, believing that the action, insofar as it is intentional, is the physical 
instantiation of a particular motive or quality of character. Helping us along in 
this process, Hume raises an important and controversial distinction in Book II, 
namely that between the liberty of indifference, which is essentially a negation of 
necessity and causes, and the liberty of spontaneity, which is opposed to 
8 
violence.16 By raising this distinctiqn he intends to show that the common 
conception of freedom (the liberty of indifference) actually undermines 
traditional ethics when it comes to moral evaluation and agency. That is because 
the absence of necessity and causes results in randomness or chance, according to 
Hume, and an action that is random does not follow from a person's character 
and so does not carry any moral weight or meaning.17 Thus, for an agent and an 
action to be connected in a way required of freely chosen actions, free will 
requires determinism! 18 
Not to get too carried away, Hume's determinism is a soft one. How it 
plays out is a "free" action is detennined to the extent that it takes place within a 
given context and with respect to a particular agent's interests, desires, 
motivations and intentions.19 What's therefore at stake is the assumption that we 
can never divorce ourselves from our surroundings and we are historical entities, 
inasmuch as our actions are influenced by our past and present experiences, and 
future goals. 
So explained, determinism is not to be understood as akin to or even 
associated with coercion, but rather necessity. And necessity, unlike coercion, 
doesn't entail a total loss of freedom or control, but rather that there are 
limitations to our freedom - that it is not absolute. 
16 Hume, 2.3.2.1. 
17 Hume, 2.3.2.6. 
18 Hume, 2.3.2.6. 
191bid. 
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This, instead of abs9lving us from moral responsibility and evaluation, 
actually enables its proper attribution, Hume tells us. Any judgement of moral 
responsibility must presuppose the causal relation between motive and action, for 
we do not blame human beings for particular actions they perform, but for the 
qualities of character that motivated the action. 20 
There is therefore a strong sense in which Hume is telling us that a person 
is determined to act in a certain way by virtue of being the person he or she is. 
While there is certainly choice involved when it comes to deciding on an 
appropriate course of action, the act of choosing requires an historical self and 
must necessarily take place within a causally determined context. 
This is where William R. Carter, Peter van Inwagen, Richard Taylor and 
Randolph Clarke come in, focusing on the implications Hume's theory holds for 
deliberation. Specifically, their arguments centre around the issue of whether 
freedom requires choice among real, or merely perceived alternatives for possible 
action. For Carter, van Inwagen and Taylor, an agent who deliberates requires a 
belief in freedom, because otherwise that deliberation would be pointless. 21 
Holding the minority position, Clarke argues that while helpful it is not the belief 
in genuine alternatives that is necessary for freedom and deliberation; what is 
necessary is the belief that deliberation will not be pointless. 22 
20 Hume, 2.3.2.6. 
21 Taylor, Richard, "Deliberation and Foreknowledge," in American Philosophical 
Quarterly (Volume 1, 1964), 76. 
22 Clarke, Randolph, "Deliberation and Beliefs about one's abilities," in Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly (Vol. 73, 1992), 107. 
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My thinking is that an agent may consistently believe that the causal chain 
determining her action includes deliberation and that deliberation can be 
effective in determining her action. What underlies and hopefully resolves this 
seeming counter-intuitiveness is the proposition that regardless of whether the 
universe is determined, the fact of the matter remains that the future is unknown 
and that a person's actions certainly help to determine that future. 
Still, there remains the issue of how we are to evaluate a person's quality of 
character when their actions are determined. Granted, like Hume tells us, causal 
determinism does enable us to connect an action to its antecedent motive; 
however, the rationality of going through this process and evaluating a person's 
action is tied to figuring out what might have been. But if a person's action is 
determined, then there are no actual possibilities for action; there is simply the 
realization of the actual. Thus, if we suppose that selves are constantly changing, 
rendering, among other things, our knowledge of them approximate and 
contingent, and if all of our actions are determined, can we ever be justified in 
speculating as to what a person might have done in a given situation? 
As I see it, Hume's theories of personal identity and free will seem to lead 
to the conclusion that we are not justified in evaluating another because : (1) If a 
person's identity is always changing, assessing it is not only unfeasible but also 
defeats the purpose of evaluation, which is to define or limit. (2) All that we can 
scrutinize are words and actions, so our evaluations must ultimately depend upon 
merely prevalent qualities of character. And (3) if a person's action was 
determined then she could not have done otherwise. With that, her action cannot 
11 
be evaluated along the lines of "She did x but could have done y," but rather "She 
did x and this is what it says about her presently." 
Surely, this foundation lends itself to description of another rather than 
judgement. Does Hume offer an adequate method for evaluation elsewhere in the 
Treatise? 
This leads me to Chapter 4· Resuming and building upon a theme from 
Chapter 3, my task will be to determine whether, when combined with his theory 
of self, Hume's theory of sympathy allows for moral judgements or simply moral 
determinations. It is important to point out that I take moral determinations to 
leave us with a means to distinguish between the good and the bad in a 
rudimentary and intuitive manner, whereas moral judgements enable us to 
justifiedly extend our determinations further, allowing us to say" Jane is x type of 
person" and regard her accordingly. This is not Hume's distinction, it is mine. 
At the risk of spoiling the ending, it turns out that, for Hume, moral 
judgements are grounded in feeling rather than reason, and lack any rational 
justification independent of the moral sense. 23 More specifically yet cursorily 
here, he believes that moral judgements are grounded in the sympathetic 
emotional responses of pleasure and pain, which enliven the idea we have of 
another to the point where it is very much like the vivacity of an impression.2 4 
Thereafter, our judgements are refined by taking account of some general and 
stable points of view. 
23 Hume, 3.1.1.26. 
24 Hume, 2.1.11.8. 
Thus, sympathy plays a crucial role in both motivating and evaluating 
moral action, and it is a more or less sophisticated idea of self that evokes and 
engages our sympathy.25 Only by finding a 'parallel in ourselves' can we come to 
appreciate, even vicariously experience another's feelings, says Hume.26 
12 
This is a point of contention for Norman Kemp-Smith and Don Garrett, 
who question whether Hume's theory of sympathy requires the idea of enduring 
self he denied in Book I. Kemp-Smith argues that Hume essentially substitutes 
our shared capacities and dispositions (sympathy) later in the Treatise for the 
idea of 'enduring self he argued we could not have in Book I. Garrett disagrees, 
asserting the 'sympathetic self Hume speaks of is not to be synonymous with the 
'enduring self from earlier in the Treatise. The 'sympathetic self is simply the 
impressions or memories of ourselves that enable the mental mechanism of 
sympathy to be triggered. 
Not unlike Garrett, I will argue that all Hume needs in his account of 
sympathy is that at any particular time when we are conscious there should be a 
complex impression we can identify as the impression of our own person. This 
impression need not remain unchanging, serving as the foundation for the idea of 
enduring self, but simply lend itself at all times during our conscious existence to 
represent the "self'. 
But this is rather incidental to my major concern in this chapter, which is 
the culmination of those raised throughout this thesis, namely: Are we justified in 
25 Hume, 2.1.11.5. 
21 Ibid. 
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making binding judgements about another by virtue of sympathy and after having 
arrived at an impartial perspective? 
For Hume the answer is yes. After having corrected for variations due to 
our particular situations, he explains, every normal person can arrive at the same 
moral stance. When this process is properly carried out, our moral judgements 
are justifiable. 27 
Seyla Benhabib and Hannah Arendt agree that moral judgement is 
properly carried out when a person consults with his common sense, essentially 
distancing himself from private interests and thereby achieving a generality or 
universality of outcome.2s In so doing, he judges as a member of a community 
rather than a self-interested individual. 
Though nice in theory, Lisa Disch believes that at the end of the day we can 
only ever achieve relative impartiality.29 That is because we are ultimately left to 
draw our own conclusions from our consideration of the possible judgements of 
others. Having its basis in what we take to be another's interests and concerns, 
what we achieve through this process is impartiality which is not neutrality - a 
situated impartiality. 
This criticism is further supported by Iris Marion Young, who believes that 
this method of evaluation, instead of giving us a more objective standpoint, 
27 Hume, 3.1.2.3. 
28 Benhabib, Seyla, "Judgement and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Hannah Arendt's Thought," in 
Situating the Self: gender, community, and postmodemism in contemporary ethics (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1992), 124, 305. 
29 Disch, Lisa, "More Truth Than Fact," in Political Theory (Vol. 21, Nov., 1993), 672. 
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requires and reinforces the assumption that all subjects are similar. It fails to take 
into account that we each have our own unique life-stories, emotional habits and 
values, and because of this our positions are unique and irreversible,3° Young 
explains. 
I take this to be precisely where Hume's theory leaves us. Let me qualify 
that by saying: If, as Hume holds, the passions are simple impressions and all 
simple ideas are copies of simple impressions, then I cannot form the idea of 
another person's emotion and sympathize with him or her unless I have first 
experienced the corresponding impression. It follows that I can only sympathize 
with experiences that I've had myself or were similar to my own. That being so, 
the moral point of view must call into operation at least one sentiment common 
to all (normal) persons, otherwise it would not succeed in bringing everyone's 
judgements into agreement. 
Now, to my understanding, a situation we could all see similarly and agree 
upon would be rather trivial and arbitrary - a truism that need not be considered 
in the first place. While the feelings of pleasure and pain may be universal to all 
human beings, cultures differ very much on what they define as right and wrong. 
As a consequence, I believe that moral principles are only provisionally true, 
where they apply to most people, in most cultures, in most circumstances, most of 
the time. 
30 Although relevant and helpful, I should mention this criticism was not directed at Hume's philosophy in 
particular but rather the moral stance generally. 
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Because Burne's moral stance ultimately has its basis in our perceptions of 
another, assumes that you or I can know what it is like to be that person by virtue 
of having had similar experiences sufficient to call sympathy into operation, I 
believe it is an inadequate basis for moral judgement. Moreover, supposing our 
knowledge of an individual's nature can only ever be approximate and our 
judgements vague, such that "Jane may be x type of person, but in a moment she 
may be another," the nature of Humean selves must necessarily elude 
comprehensive understanding. That said, the argument I will develop and 
advance herein is: Selves can only ever be described on Hume's line, not judged. 
However, perhaps with the addition of Iris Marion Young's theory of 
asymmetrical reciprocity, we can allow for Burne's theory of self and for us to 
understand that very "self," even with its many facades and complexities. True, 
there are contingent aspects that affect our analysis in every situation, so we must 
factor in individual idiosyncrasies to arrive at any kind of understanding and 
moral stance. Still, by coming to know a person's character through its 
background history and thereafter framing it within its proper context, we can 
come to genuinely appreciate and evaluate a person's perspective and the actions 
it informs. But, I emphasize, only by reference to his or her revealed past. What 
we are left with, then, are not judgements, but rather informed descriptions. 
16 
Chapter 2: Unfolding Hume's theory and its Criticisms 
It's not enough to refute a beautiful idea, it must be replaced with 
something equally beautiful; otherwise, in my heart, unwilling to part with 
my feeling for anything, I will refute the refutation, even by force, whatever 
they may say. 
- Dostoevsky, The Adolescent 
While some scholars have taken Hume to say that selves are constantly 
changing and through this change there isn't even an underlying sense or 
intuition of self that remains, I think quite the contrary is laid out in Book I part 
IV of the Treatise, wherein Hume tells us that the more our actions and 
temperaments resemble those of the past, the more coherent and consistent a 
picture of "self' we get.31 
Equally misdirected are criticisms to the effect that Hume's account of 
personal identity is inconsistent - that he assigns various roles to 'self later in the 
Treatise that his initial theory does not allow for. Perhaps the most persuasively 
argued are those criticisms raised by Terence Penelhum, Barry Stroud and Jane 
L. Mcintyre. Fittingly, this chapter will be largely preoccupied with examining the 
subtleties of these arguments, why they are intuitively appealing and well-
received, and why they should not be because they fail to truly engage with 
Hume's theory. First, however, let me begjn by offering a detailed exegesis of 
Hume's account of personal identity, which I touched on in the previous chapter, 
so as to provide the reader with the fundamentals of Hume's argument and 
31 Hume, 1.4.6.6. 
thereafter orient the criticisms within their proper context and evaluate them 
accordingly. 
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Let's begin. In Book I part IV of the Treatise, Hume offers two arguments 
aiming to prove that there can be no idea of an enduring self continuing the same 
throughout the whole course of a person's lived existence. The first argument 
depends on the contingent fact that there is no continual impression from which 
such an idea could be derived. 
You'll remember that, for Hume, simple ideas are derived from preceding 
simple impressions, so in order to have an idea of a simple, unchanging self, we 
would require a simple impression that remained constant, even while all of our 
other perceptions changed. But this is impossible, according to Hume, because 
"pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, 
and never all exist at the same time ...• "32 
This problematizes, if not frustrates, our attempts at knowledge of 
ourselves as enduring because it renders our foundation unstable. More 
specifically, supposing (1) our ideas are the building-blocks of knowledge, (2) 
ideas are derived from and owe their consistency and longevity to that of their 
antecedent sensory impressions, then (3) surely, if our impressions are subject to 
vary and pass (as Hume tells us they are), our ideas are contingent and our self-
knowledge is approximate at best. And this is exactly what Hume means to prove 
when he says, "I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never 
32 Hume, 1.4.6.2. 
18 
can observe anything but the perception ...• "33 
In short, our perceptions are constitutive of self-knowledge, our ideas, 
which inform our impressions, vary and pass in accordance with their antecedent 
impressions, thus knowledge of ourselves as enduring the same through time is 
impossible. 
The second argument Hume advances in support of his theory rests on the 
claim that it is contradictory to suppose there could be an impression of self since 
self is what has impressions and is not itself an impression. In other words, in 
order to have an impression of self it is necessary that self be physically 
perceivable. But self is not physically perceivable, so a self-like impression of an 
immaterial self is a contradiction because it would require an impression of that 
which is distinct from any impression. And since we are aware only of 
impressions, none of which remain invariable and uninterrupted throughout our 
lives, it follows that that to which we seek to attribute a perfect identity is 
"nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each 
other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement."34 
If Hume has it right, how are we to reconcile the common belief that self 
endures with his theory that self is nothing but a bundle of perceptions? How did 
we get so far off the mark? Perhaps it might be helpful to first question: How does 
the belief that self endures arise in the first place? 
34 Ibid. 
34 Hume, 1.4.6.4. 
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The short answer is: Experience. Hume's longer answer follows. Much like 
the methodology involved in coming to understand the natural world, through 
observing human interaction we begin to infer connections between that which is 
constantly conjuncted, namely an apparent type of motive and a given 
behaviour .as This gives rise to a habit of thinking where upon any further 
experience of behaviour A we expect motive B to be behind it, inferring the 
"existence of one from that of another."a6 In this way, actions, as signs of a 
person's motives and intentions, take on an air of consistency, and, because of 
this, we come to believe that we can predict a:p.d explain a person's actions with 
relative ease, and know something about him as a person. Not unusual or 
unintuitive is the claim "Jim is x type of person." Interestingly, you'll notice that 
such a claim assumes a person's motives are physically expressible in his or her 
actions, that identity is consistent over time, and that persons are therefore 
knowable. 
However, despite their intuitive ease and appeal, these assumptions are 
unwarranted according to Hume. They are the result of a conceptual error which 
is based on a confused understanding of the concepts identity and diversity. 
Identity, Hume explains, is properly assigned to an object which persists through 
a length of time without change or interruption. Diversity, on the other hand, 
applies to a succession of objects, even closely related ones.a7 Although a 
35 Hume, 2.3.1.5. 
36 Hume, 2.3.1.14. 
37 Hume, 1.4.6.6. 
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seemingly obvious and trivial distinction, Hume nevertheless draws our attention 
to it so as to highlight the conceptual impasse that occurs when it comes to 
applying these concepts to selves. 
The confusion arises because we have a distinct idea of an object that 
remains "invariable and uninterrupted thro' a suppos'd variation of time" and this 
is the idea of identity or sameness. We also have a distinct idea of several different 
objects that exist in succession which are connected together by a close relation; 
yet, this relatedness, if looked on properly, "affords as perfect a notion of 
diversity, as if there was no manner of relation among the objects." Thus, 
although the ideas of identity and diversity are perfectly distinct, even contrary, 
it's clear that in our common way of thinking we confound the one with the 
other.3B 
When it comes to selves, Hume tells us, we confuse the application of the 
ideas identity and diversity because the succession of perceptions we have about 
ourselves is so closely woven that it is difficult to tell there are different 
perceptions. Not unlike our belief in the identity of an external object, then, this 
belief is the result of our confusing the awareness we have of our related but ever-
changing perceptions for the awareness of something unchanging. 
The mistake in attributing personal identity to successive, distinct 
perceptions is not simply a verbal misnomer, then. It is also, and more 
importantly, a conceptual error; in believing in personal identity we believe that 
"self' actually refers to something consistent and knowable. But if Hume has it 
39 flume, 1.4.6.6-7. 
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right, "self' has no identical referent because there is nothing that binds our 
various perceptions together. We cannot run our many and varying perceptions 
into one coherent idea and make them lose their distinctiveness precisely because 
their distinctive qualities are essential to and constitutive of them. 
Terence Penelhum disagrees, arguing we do have an idea of self and it is 
precisely that enduring object we take it to be.39 He criticizes the sharp distinction 
Hume draws between sameness (identity) and series (diversity) on the basis that 
we tend to linguistically and conceptually collapse the two concepts when it 
comes to selves. For Penelhum, this tendency should not be dismissed or its 
implications trivialized. In case you're not convinced by imploration alone, he 
asks that you consider the unchanging single object, "X". 
X, we would say, is the same throughout. Let us call our succession of 
distinct but related objects A, B, C, D, E, F, etc. Here, if we count, we 
obviously have several, not one. But we can quite easily produce a class-
name for the series of them, say A, such that a A is, by definition, any group 
of things like A, B, C, D, E, F, etc. So there would be no contradiction in 
saying there are six objects and one A; this is what a A is. 4° 
Here Penelhum is suggesting that "change" should be understood as 
relative to the kind of thing we are talking about. By subsuming a person's various 
qualities under one class name we can thereby have many things and only one 
thing at the same time. This would allow for a person to undergo various 
'changes' without necessarily compromising their identity, and without our 
39 Penelhum, Terence, "Hume on Personal Identity," inHume: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. V.C. 
Chappell (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 225-26. 
41 Penelhum, 226. 
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having to understand them as ceasing to exist and giving place to something 
else.41 
By following through on Hume's notion of change Penelhum thinks we 
may come to appreciate this concern. Take a person who claims "I am the person 
who won the Grand Prix." Such a person is committed to saying he has in no way 
changed since the time of his victory, says Penelhum.42 
I disagree. On my reading of Hume, unless the Grand Prix winner defines 
himself as such and believes that this single idea constitutes the whole or sum of 
his existence, he would not be committed to saying he hasn't changed since the 
time of his victory. If instead (and I think more likely) the Grand Prix winner 
most identifies with this idea of himself, yet still has other ideas about himself, he 
has simply failed to offer a comprehensive, definitive account, which, for practical 
purposes, is completely unfeasible and, I presume, undesirable anyway. 
Interestingly enough, Hume too believed that change is commonly 
understood as relative to the kind of thing we are talking about. He tells us 
explicitly in both the Treatise and Enquiry that the mind feels very much the 
same when passing over related objects and impressions as it does when 
contemplating a single, abiding object, and that this is natural.43 The difference 
between Penelhum and Hume's theories is therefore less about how we 
commonly understand change and more about its proper understanding. While 
41 Penelhum, 225-26. 
42 Penelhum, 227. 
43 Hume, 1.4.6.5. 
Hume thinks any perceptible change has implications for our understanding of 
the object in question, Penelhum sees change in relativistic terms. 
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Although they are working under different definitions of change, 
Penelhum and Hume are left with the same difficulty when it comes to moving 
from describing the nature of selves generally to understanding the nature of a 
particular self. Considering it is self-understanding Penelhum was attempting to 
improve upon, it is not only anti-climactic it is self-defeating that his theory, like 
Hume's, would require that we sort through our various ideas and impressions 
(subsumed under the class-name "self') and ultimately choose the most essential 
to constitute selfs endurance. 
True, Penelhum's theory has preserved our common understanding of self, 
yet without Hume's cautionary proviso that it is a mistaken understanding. Thus, 
where Penelhum's theory would leave us thinking the inadequacy in 
understanding ourselves as enduring was due to our limited capacity to 
understand such a complex entity, Hume points out that there can be no 
enduring idea of self to begin with, so any attempts to arrive at such an idea, let 
alone understand the nature of such a self, 11re futile. It would see:m., then, that 
Penelhum, instead of arguing against Hume, actually furthers Hume's argument 
by showing us why there is the need to have a strict notion of identity in the first 
place. 
Instead of focusing on Hume's strict notion of "change" and its 
implications for our understanding of one another, Jane L. Mcintyre tells us 
Hume's theory requires exactly that which he is attempting to disprove. 
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Specifically, he needs a genuinely enduring empirical self to underlay the 
associative mechanisms that form the core of his theory. 
The concept of a self that is affected by experience and therefore must 
persist through experience is precisely the concept of the self that cannot 
be accounted for in the context of the theory of ideas presented in the 
Treatise.44 
Mcintyre seems to be suggesting that in order to be affected by experience 
we must persist through time such that there is something of the past that carries 
over into the present, enabling the occurrence of the transition from the one state 
to the other. While intuitive and convincing, I fail to see how this is a critique of 
Hume's theory of personal identity. 
It shouldn't come as a surprise, given his empiricist leanings, that Hume 
assumes experience as the basis for knowledge claims when articulating his 
theory of ideas. He explains that we can never have reason to believe that any 
object exists, of which we cannot form an idea.45 To have a reason for believing 
that X exists is therefore to have present those conditions which allow for a causal 
inference to be drawn, and no causal inference can be made unless one has had 
experience of the constant conjunction of similar objects. 
Thus, like causes producing like effects have great implications not only for 
our explanations, but also for our explanatory power, pointing to our knowledge 
or our ignorance of the ways of the world and our place within it. That said, we do 
not have a reason for believing that an enduring self exists. But does this entail 
44 Mcintyre, JaneL. as quoted in Fogelin, Robert, "Hume's Scepticism", in The Cambridge Companion to 
Hume, ed. David Fate Norton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 101. 
45 Hume, 1.4.6.2. 
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Mcintyre's further charge that Hume is committed to saying enduring selves do 
not exist? 
Taking the approach of Hume scholar, WadeL. Robison, I am inclined to 
reason that "[i]f the conditions for making a claim of existence do not exist, 
neither do the conditions for making a claim of non-existence."46 Provided that 
we cohfine this reasoning to immaterial selves (rather than using it as a platform 
from which to draw parallels to such possible entities as, say ghosts, monsters, 
faeries or unicorns), instead of being naive and superfluous, Robison's rationale is 
intuitively appealing and does some heavy lifting in pressing the issue. 
To my understanding, what Hume has argued is that we cannot have an 
idea of ourselves as enduring the same through time. Now, this claim is 
independent of and does not entail the further claim that self cannot endure in 
some way. Rather, it entails consistency is not a part of selfs essential nature, 
and, accordingly, a strict notion of personal identity does not apply to selves. 
Additionally, when we consider that knowledge, for Hume, is predicated on 
experience of like causes producing like effects, it would seem that any attempts 
to arrive at knowledge of an enduring immaterial self are futile, given that it is not 
subject to empirical observation or scrutiny. And this says little about the possible 
abidingness of selves and much about the human condition. Specifically, it points 
to our need to make meaningful that which tends to elude us and the grappling 
and negotiation involved in doing so. 
46 Robison, WadeL. "Hume's Ontological Commitments," in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 
102, (Hume Bicentenary Issue, Jan., 1976), 45. 
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As I see it, when we cannot arrive at knowledge, it means we either lack the 
relevant information, which we may or may not one day possess, or that the 
nature of what we are investigating must prove elusory to the understanding. 
When it comes to an immaterial self what is contradictory, then, is not that there 
might be an immaterial self, but that we might have an impression and resultant 
idea of it. What lack of knowledge does not entail is that the object or subject in 
question does not exist, but rather that there is nothing known about the object 
beyond our perceptions. 
That said, Hume does not require an idea of an enduring self to support his 
theory that we cannot have an idea of an enduring self. All he needs is to make 
plausible the idea that an accurate understanding of "self' must account for many 
more or less consistent and related perceptions - or selves if you like. I hasten to 
add that the idea of "self' to which my "selves" refer need not be enduring, but 
rather a class name for simplicity's sake, and so is quite unlike that which 
Penelhum speaks of. Essentially, then, we cannot have an enduring idea of self, 
but we can have an idea of a bundle of perceptions that are related by 
resemblance and causation, and this, for Hume, is "the true idea of the human 
mind."47 
Barry Stroud presents a related concern, suggesting that Burne's theory 
reduces "mind" to something fictitious. If the mind or imagination is mistakenly 
led to think that there is an individual enduring mind and that belief is an 
illusion, since we are nothing but bundles of perceptions, Stroud wonders "what 
47 Hume, 1.4.7.22. 
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is mistakenly led to think that there is an individual enduring self'?48 "To say 'the 
mind' or 'the imagination' is not vety helpful, since strictly speaking there is no 
such thing; there is only a bundle ofperceptions."49 
Essentially, Stroud makes three claims here: (1) on Hume's line the 
individual mind does not endure, so (2) what we commonly take to be the mind is 
an illusion, leading us to the conclusion that (3) strictly speaking there is no such 
thing as mind. If I've read him correctly, I suspect Stroud has equated 'we have a 
mistaken belief in what constitutes mind' with 'if the mind is a bundle of 
perceptions, then the mind itself is illusory'. 
I think this is an inaccurate interpretation of Hume, largely because the 
mind is active on Hume's line, playing a major role in apprehending and ordering 
experience from impressions into coherent ideas, and also reflecting on that vecy 
experience. Now, one's idea or theory of an enduring mind, like his or her idea of 
an enduring self is a different matter altogether, which may or may not properly 
capture the nature of mind itself. If, then, a given theoty shows us that we have 
not or cannot understand the nature of mind, this points to nothing more than a 
failure to understand, not a lack of existence. I'm quite confident in thinking 
Hume doesn't mean to say that the mind is illusory, but rather we've 
misunderstood its nature and this is what it really is: a bundle of perceptions that 
we may or may not understand as such. Thus, the problem Hume presents us 
with is not whether the mind exists, but rather how we are to understand the 
48 Stroud, Barry, Hume (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 129. 
491bid. 
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nature of something we have commonly taken to exist the same through time 
when in actuality it does not. 
What I'm getting at, then, is it is not necessary for an abstract idea 
representing a class of things with a common quality to be preceded by an 
impression that is the separate and distinct impression of that quality.so Simply 
put, I think Stroud has failed to distinguish between our belief in the integrity of 
the concept "mind" and the nature of mind itself, which is not affected by whether 
we grasp it or not, though it may be understood with some struggle. 
Unlike those of the scholars I have raised, my primary concern is not with 
misnomers or the uneasiness that comes with new ways of understanding the 
nature of self, but rather the implications Hume's theory of personal identity has 
for judgement, especially moral judgement. I want to begin by saying if Hume 
were simply pointing out that we are bound to be mistaken in believing in 
enduring selves, his theory would be little more than philosophically interesting. 
The problem is that he goes further, claiming we need not make this mistake at 
all, that our belief in identity is defective in meaning and can be suppressed. 51 If 
Hume has it right, it's important to challenge if not discard the belief that selves 
endure the same through time and are thus knowable, because it has implications 
for how we properly relate to and understand one another. 
This concern best shows itself insofar as the judgements that we make are 
often binding and presuppose a self that endures. Typically in judging we are 
50 Garrett, Don, "Hume's Self-Doubts about Personal Identity," in The Philosophical 
Review,. Vol. 90, No.3 (pp. 337-358), July, 1981, 342. 
51 Hume, 1.4.6.7. 
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saying something like "Jane is x type of person" and we thereafter commit her to 
certain ends that may have great (be they positive or negative) implications for 
her quality of life. Not only does this highlight the need for our assessments to be 
accurate and representative, the practice of judging relies on a conception of 
selves as enduring and knowable. 
To be sure, judgement certainly serves an important purpose. Demarcating 
and differentiating enables us to categorize based upon our shared needs and 
interests and subsequently arrive at a basis for censure or commendation. In fact, 
in theory there is nothing problematic about judging until we ask (a) whether or 
not reference to an object differs from the description of it; (b) whether truth 
pertains to reference or to description or to both at once; and (c) whether either 
reference or description applies to the object as cognized or to the object as real.s2 
I suspect that when it comes to judging selves we need both reference and 
description; the referred real is the subject of characterization and the described 
real is the characterized object. 53 
Now, when we apply this to Humean selves, reference would be to 
something "real" but to the real as unspecified, because the identity of the person 
under scrutiny is constantly changing.s4 I don't think it's overstating to say such a 
judgement would be absurd and the practice of judging, when applied to Humean 
52 Loewenberg, J., "The Paradox of Judgment," in The Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 25, No.8, Apr. 12, 
1928), 203. 
53 Loewenberg, 204. 
54 Loewenberg, 202. 
selves, would be superfluous at best. Hume's "self' can only be captured for a 
moment in time and is subject to change from one moment to the next. 
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Of course, character is expressed in a person's actions, but each new act 
creates a partly new character, and character as already formed implies only a 
certain range of probabilities and possibilities for action. Each moment we shift, 
for good or ill, this range.ss Considering judgement is, primarily, an attempt to 
define and limit something for the sake of understanding and Humean selves are 
always changing, judgement would be inconclusive and would lose its significance 
entirely. 
Presuming judgements of selves (1) cannot refer to anything enduring and 
(2) lose their significance when they cannot be used as a tool for understanding, it 
would seem that the only justifiedness to be found is in describing, not judging 
another. 
So argued, legitimation of judgement is not afforded by Hume's theory of 
personal identity alone. Let us see, then, whether his theory of free will, which I 
will take up in the following chapter, can serve to legitimate those judgements 
that his theory of personal identity alone would render inconclusive and thus 
inadequate. 
55 Hartshorne, 21 0-11. 
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Chapter a: Hume's theory of freedom and its implications for agency, 
responsibility, and moral judgement 
The consequences of our actions take us by the scruff of the neck, altogether 
indifferent to the fact that we have 'improved' in the meantime. 
- Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 
I don't believe in the freedom of the will. Schopenhauer' s saying, that a human 
can very well do what he wants, but can not will what he wants, accompanies me 
in all of life's circumstances and reconciles me with the actions of humans, even 
when they are truly distressing. This knowledge of the non-freedom of the will 
protects me from losing my good humor and taking much too seriously myself 
and my fellow humans as acting and judging individuals. 
- Albert Einstein 
It has often been maintained that it is impossible, in principle, to give 
satisfactory causal explanations of all human actions. This is due, in no small 
part, to the belief that some human actions are free, in the sense that they are not 
causally determined and, as such, do not lend themselves to causal explanation. 
These undetermined or absolutely free actions, presumably, take place outside of 
the causal nexus, so any attempt to establish a theory that appeals to causal 
explanations must be at a loss when it comes to giving a satisfactory account of 
these actions. The theory of free will, in particular, has difficulty integrating 
human beings into the physical world-order. We are left asking: How can we be 
free if everything in nature is causally determined and we are part of nature? 
Interestingly, many philosophers have chalked the freedom this theory 
affords up to randomness or chance. If an accurate characterization, freedom's 
instantiation wouldn't be meaningful, because if something occurs at random or 
by chance, then it is unintentional, and unintended actions do not follow from a 
person's character, and, with that, do not carey any moral weight or meaning. 
Meaningless and irrelevant to moral theory, there is no need to worcy about it, 
they say. 
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Suffice it to say, we do not want our freedom to be random or chance - we 
want it to issue forth from something within us, for it to be meaningful. What it 
seems we must look for, then, is a theory describing a sense in which freedom is 
compatible with the causal necessity assumed and required by the science of 
universal causation, i.e. that the same actions can at once be free and causally 
determined, and, as such, meaningful. 
David Hume attempts to do just that in Book II part III of the Treatise. He 
begins by telling us that although we tend to (and like to) believe human actions 
are not determined - that they are, instead, instances of absolute freedom - there 
are no spontaneous actions or events.s6 Evecy action has at least one cause and 
causes determine their effects, such that given the occurrence of the cause-event, 
the effect-event is inevitable. Equally subject to causal determinism, we cannot 
divide actions into two mutually exclusive classes, the free and the determined. 
Flying in the face of absolute freedom, Hume develops his criticism by 
applying his general analysis of causal necessity in Book I (which we saw in the 
previous chapter) to human actions. Specifically, he argues that if our judgements 
concerning human actions are causal judgements, which arise from the "constant 
conjunction" of two ideas, as well as an inference from one to the other, we must 
s1 Hume, 2.3.2.1. 
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attribute necessity to human actions. And that is because these inferences would 
have the same origin and structure as our other causal judgements. 57 It is 
important to note, that the necessity involved in the causal relation belongs to the 
mind that is thinking about or observing the sequences, not to the action itself. 
Not only does Hume concede that necessity is in the mind, he goes further, 
speaking to and supporting our intuitions concerning the nature of freedom when 
he defines the will as "the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when 
we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our 
mind."ss However, Hume is quick to point out that 'feeling free' is quite unlike 
'experiencing freedom'. This distinction is especially apparent when he tells us 
that this feeling of liberty is a "false sensation" that is made obvious when we 
consider that "a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and 
character," or at least expects to be able to do so if he or she were "perfectly 
acquainted with every circumstance of our disposition and character."s9 
A possible and well-worn objection is that human actions do not display 
any such regularity. They are, instead, notoriously "inconsistent" and 
"capricious," often seeming irregular and uncertain to any observer, especially 
when compared to the operations of matter, which are supposedly equally subject 
to causal determinism. 
57 Hume, 2.3.1.4. 
58 Hume, 2.3.1.2. 
59 Hume, 2.3.2.2. 
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Anticipating this objection, Hume reminds us that we often encounter 
irregularities in a series of physical events and, upon proper consideration of such 
unexpected events, we conclude that they are not random but are rather the 
effects of"contrary and conceal'd causes."6o When we extend this reasoning to 
human actions (which Hume thinks is a proper parallel), if we are unable to 
identify the motive for a particular action, we can safely assume that the action 
arose from a motive that is not immediately apparent to us, not that the action 
was random or a matter of chance. 6t 
While human beings are undeniably part of nature and are therefore 
subject to causal determinism, this parallel will only carry us so far because, 
unlike the happenings of matter, an individual's temperament, inclinations and 
motivations also contribute to determining her actions. 62 Thus, the manner in 
which human beings apprehend, order, and interpret sense phenomena makes 
our actions more deliberate, sophisticated and complex to the understanding 
than those of the unintentional intermingling of matter. 
Of course, the complexity and distinction is only an appreciable issue for 
the mind that is attempting to understand a person's action -to make it 
meaningful. Were we to have complete access to a person's inner workings, Hume 
believes we could read her actions just like those of nature, for "[n]o union can be 
more constant and certain, than that of some actions with some motives and 
60 Hume, 2.3.1.12. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Hume, 2.3.1.4. 
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characters ...• "63 This shows itself even in the general dynamics at play in our 
social roles and relationships. For example, typically, a prisoner who has nothing 
to offer a jailor discovers the impossibility of his escape just as easily from the 
"obstinacy of the jailor," as he does from the walls and bars he is surrounded by.64 
What does this leave us with? Can we be said to act freely on any occasion 
if Hume's theory of universal causation is true? Not according to William R. 
Carter, who believes freedom requires genuine alternatives and universal 
causation does not allow for them. 
We never have [genuine] alternatives because each of our actions is such 
that it is (indirectly) caused by, and thus determined by, events that 
occurre<;l before we are born. We have no control over such events; since 
those events determine all our actions, we have no alternatives to the 
actions we perform. Our present assumptions concerning causality point to 
the disturbing conclusion that we never act freely.6s 
If, as Carter suggests, we never have genuine alternatives, it would seem 
that deliberation (the process through which we decide a course of action) is 
unable to serve its intended purpose. This is further complicated by the fact that 
the deliberative process seems to "require a belief (or beliefs) that one can 
perform each of the actions under consideration."66 Surely, any agent who 
deliberates about which of two mutually excluding actions to perform will, if she 
is consistent and rational, believe that she has the ability to do otherwise, 
63 Hume, 2.3.1.13. 
64 Hume, 2.3.1.17. 
65 Carter, William R, The Elements of Metaphysics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989), 32. 
66 Taylor, 76. 
according to Richard Taylor and Peter van Inwagen. Otherwise, deliberation 
would be pointless and the deliberator would know this. 67 
Randolph Clarke disagrees. Although a belief in genuine alternatives is 
typically a part of the idea of freedom under which we actually deliberate, that 
fact alone does not show the belief is necessary for deliberation. 68 In fact, it is 
36 
actually the absence of beliefs about inabilities that is necessary for deliberation, 
not the positive belief in freedom, in genuine alternatives. 69 What the deliberator 
must believe, Clarke explains, is that the activity of deliberating will not be 
pointless.7o 
While sympathetic to Clarke's, my own view is largely influenced by 
William James. I believe that an agent may consistently believe that the causal 
chain determining his action includes deliberation and that deliberation can be 
effective in contributing to determining his action. Though seemingly 
contradictory, the dissonance is resolvable by realizing that regardless of whether 
the universe is determined, the fact that the future is unknown and that a 
person's actions help to determine that future remain.71 Because we cannot know 
the extent to which our actions are determined by deliberation, I think the most 
61 
van Inwagen, 156. 
68 Clarke, 102. 
69 Clarke, 103. 
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° Clarke, 103. 
71 James, William, "The Dilemma of Determinism," in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular 
Philosophy, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, et al (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1979), 53. 
reasonable position to hold is that we are unequipped to comment conclusively 
on, let alone disregard its possible efficaciousness. 
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Focusing on the issue within Burne's philosophy, while a decision-making 
process eXists in his theory of free will, this process is governed by a causal chain 
of events, such that a decision is determined by the conditions that existed prior 
to the decision being made.72 Free will should not be understood as an absolute 
ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same circumstances, then, but 
rather a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently given a different 
psychological state or disposition.73 
What Hume means by this is when I say I could either go outside for a run 
or continue writing this section, I don't really mean both choices are compatible 
with the complete state of the world right now (including my motivations and the 
context I find myself in). Instead, I mean that if I desired to go for a run I would 
have, even though as a matter of fact I actually desire to continue writing this 
paragraph, and therefore that is what will actually happen. 
Having settled the problem of deliberation, the more thorny issue of 
reconciling the two extremes - i.e. our feeling of liberty and the fact that we are as 
determined as matter - remains. Burne's suggestion for the reconciliation is that 
we first realize our belief in freedom is the consequence of an error in judgement. 
As he sees it, what a person takes to be instances of chance, spontaneity or 
disorder in nature or in man is in actuality little more than the result of his or her 
72 Hume, 2.3.1.15. 
73 Hurne, 2.3.1.15. 
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failure to trace effects back to their proper causes. So Hume's explanation goes, 
chance or indifferences "lies only in our judgment on account of our imperfect 
knowledge, not in the things themselves, which are in every case equally 
necessary, tho' to appearance not equally constant or certain."74 What Hume is 
telling is, then, is that an uncaused action isn't in the world itself, but rather it is a 
product of mind, the result of failing to connect an effect to its proper cause (or 
causes). 
If you ask me, instead of claiming an apparent instance of freedom must be 
an error in judgement, I think it's more precise (and intuitively appealing) to say: 
If actions can be uncaused, we can't have any proper or satisfactory 
understanding of them and of ourselves as free in this way. And that is precisely 
because understanding uncaused actions would require an ability to grasp what a 
break in the causal chain would be like. Given that satisfactory causal 
explanations are typically what we take to be indicative of understanding and 
we're habituated to understand events in terms of cause and effect, 
understanding a break in the causal chain and providing a satisfactory account of 
it, seems not only unfeasible but impossible. 
But, unlike Hume, I think this inability to understand an uncaused action 
doesn't entail that we must be mistaken in our judgement that it's truly uncaused. 
What it does entail is that we're not justified in judging that we're free in this way, 
because justifiedness requires satisfactory causal explanations and this kind of 
74 Hume, 2.3.1.12. 
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freedom cannot be explained in this way. Thus, even though our judgement that 
we're free - that our actions can be uncaus~d - can't be justified, it doesn't follow 
we're necessarily mistaken in judging or believing that we're free. Perhaps this is 
helpful in explaining why many people continue to believe that they are free 
despite the fact that our understanding can only reveal that we're determined. 
Semantics aside, more importantly for our purposes here is settling the 
matter of where exactly Burne's account of freedom leaves us with respect to 
moral responsibility. Personally, it leads me to question whether responsibility is 
compatible with or even sensible when it comes to an explanation purporting that 
all of our actions are determined. 
If we accept the principle of alternate possibilities, which stipulates a 
person is morally responsible for an action only if he or she could have done 
otherwise,7s it would seem that an individual is not responsible for actions that 
were determined to occur. 
Harry Frankfurt clearly disagrees with this conclusion when he argues: 
Even those who are coerced - the quintessential 'could not have done otherwise-
ers' - are morally responsible for the actions they perform, because there is 
always an alternative in any situation. True, some alternatives come with bleak 
ramifications, but "[o]ne's knowledge that he stands to suffer an intolerably harsh 
penalty does not mean that he, strictly speaking, cannot perform any action but 
the one he does perform."76 Thus, at the end of the day it is still open to him to 
75 Frankfurt, Harry G., "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," in The Journal of Philosophy 
(Vol. 66, Dec., 1969), 829. 
defy the threat and accept the penalty his action would bring down upon him.77 
No matter the difficulty or ramifications, a person always has a choice in the 
matter. 
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Although I'm intrigued by the implications this argument has for moral 
responsibility, my focus is, first and foremost, on the assumptions the argument 
relies upon. Specifically, I'm uncertain as to whether Frankfurt is actually talking 
about coercion. To my understanding, coercion precludes choice inasmuch as an 
individual is forced to perform a certain action, whether physically, 
psychologically or both. In plain terms, the coerced must act and has no 
ownership over the action he performs. Indeed, the only control the coerced may 
have is in physically achieving another's desired end, she does not control what 
her body is required to do. 
When coupled with the following considerations: (1) when making moral 
judgements we typically judge the motive behind the action and take it to point to 
a person's character, and (2) in the case of coercion the motive is not the 
coerced's, I am inclined to think (3) moral responsibility would not apply here 
and if it did it would be misdirected. 
Interestingly enough, Hume too believed that the degree of constraint 
involved in a person's actions has implications for his or her moral responsibility. 
He was particularly careful to point out that determinism is not to be understood 
as akin to or even assqciated with coercion, but rather necessity. And necessity, 
76 Frankfurt, 834. 
77 Frankfurt, 834. 
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unlike coercion, doesn't entail a total loss of freedom or control, but rather that 
there are limitations to our freedom.78 Not surprisingly, there is no getting 
outside the chain of cause and effect for Hume, who believed that a constant 
conjunction of "circumstances, tempers and motives"79 inform, if not direct, a 
person's every action. And because all actions and motives are causally and 
necessarily related, it is impossible to assert that the will is absolutely free. It 
follows that freedom consists in is being able to do what you want to do under the 
prevailing circumstances. so 
From what has just been said, two important points need emphasizing: (1) 
human actions are free in the only possible sense when they are not subjected to 
external force and coercion, and (2) such 'free' actions are determined by little 
more than the beliefs and desires of the agent, because the instantiation of 
freedom takes place within a context it is empirically explainable in causal terms. 
Now, you might think that this theory has negative implications for 
traditional ethics, many have. Most people are happy to accept that lack of 
coercion is a necessary criterion for free-will (that a coerced act is not free), but 
nevertheless doubt that it is sufficient for freedom (that an un-coerced act is free). 
They believe, therefore, that 'free will' refers to absolute, ultimate or genuine 
possibilities for beliefs, desires and actions, rather than merely counterfactual 
ones. I suspect the most striking reason for this belief is that in the absence of 
78 Hume, 2.3.2.4. 
79 Hume, 2.3.2.6. 
80 Hume, 2.3.2.4. 
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such possibilities, the belief that free will confers responsibility appears to be 
false. 
But this is not the case according to Hume, who believed his theory 
safeguards ethics for two reasons. First of all, we do not blame human beings for 
particular actions, but for the qualities of character that led them to perform the 
actions, so any judgement of moral responsibility must presuppose the causal 
relation between motive and action. 8t Without the causal relation between motive 
and action, we would have randomness, and if our actions are random they 
cannot be connected to our character in the way necessary for freely chosen 
actions. Thus, the regularities that exist between motive and action provide the 
basis for our inferences concerning human behaviour. 82 Motive, in effect, is the 
central explanatory principle involved in the interpretation of human action. 
This shows itself in the following example. When we act hastily or 
unpremeditatedly we are blamed less than when the same actions are deliberate. 
Hume explains that the reason for this is that we only blame a man for his actions 
insofar as they seem to indicate something relatively permanent in his character. 
Accordingly, if actions are not in any way determined, they cannot properly be 
subject to evaluation. 
Secondly, Hume's theory safeguards ethics by supporting the intuitions 
involved in every society's encouragement of moral action through rewards and 
punishments. 83 In rewarding and punishing behaviour we are essentially saying it 
81 Hume, 2.3.2.5-6. 
82 Hume, 2.3.1.4. 
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is subject to modification if not reinforcement. As such, we constantly assume 
human behaviour is part of the causal nexus and is subject to change by virtue of 
incentives. 
In sum, because it includes human behaviour as part of the causal chain 
and connects an individual's actions to his or her character, determinism allows 
for the proper attribution of rewards and punishments, and therefore safeguards 
ethics. 
Tying in the previous chapter, if Hume has it right with his claim that 
character is subject to modify by virtue of incentives and that there can be no idea 
of self as enduring, it follows that I can only know myself and another to a point 
and never once and for all. This leads me to question whether we can be justified 
in specqlating as to what a person might have done in a given situation when it 
comes to evaluating his or her character, considering that our knowledge of 
others does not extend beyond what we are and have been presented with; it can 
only ever be approximate. 
Where I'm going with this is the assignment of praise or blame - the 
evaluation of another - only makes sense if it is possible for him or her to be able 
to do otherwise in a given situation. Surely if a person could not have done 
otherwise, his action is unworthy of praise or blame, isn't it? Why evaluate an 
action that was determined to come about? To further the point, even the most 
careful scrutiny of another's character is dependent upon consistency and 
83 Hume, 2.3.2.5. 
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prevalence of apparent qualities, rather than abidingness of certain qualities over 
others. 
Because all that we have before us to scrutinize is the actual (what is the 
case) it seems reasonable to assume that we are not justified in favouring any one 
possibility over another with respect to what might have been the case. By only 
giving us actuality - that which is determined by the satisfaction of antecedent 
conditions beyond one's ultimate control - rather than possibility, I think Hume's 
theory of free will fails to give us adequate grounds for moral evaluation. 
Now, you might say "we can evaluate a particular person against the norm 
of human nature - what we know to be normal by virtue of custom and habit -, 
entitling us to say '"Jim could have done what Bob or Jane did and indeed what 
most of humanity would do, normally."' But, I wonder, does this help or does it 
commit us to the same end yet with the benefit of a larger sample? 
As I see it, this approach would reduce the individual to the average, 
abstracting and examining one with 'respect to the many rather than in his or her 
own light. This is problematic when you consider that it is our individual 
idiosyncrasies that lend themselves most naturally to evaluation rather than our 
commonalities. Idiosyncrasies are, by definition, instantiations of character that 
vary from one person to another and, with that, are how we are most markedly 
distinguishable with respect to our observable behaviour. Because they differ and 
stand out from the average, idiosyncrasies might well be taken to be signs of a 
character's true instantiation, the expression of which has survived the pressures 
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of socialization. Instead of anomalies set against the backdrop of the average, 
then, I think a person's idiosyncrasies go a long way in revealing character. 
At the end of the day, regardless of the sample, we are left with actuality 
rather than possibility - what has been the case for Jim in particular and a sum-
total of what has been the case for humankind at large. Thus, taking a larger 
sample does not help us to evaluate a person's character and neither does it give 
us possibilities. What it does is further explain our past actualities by 
contextualizing them on a larger scale. 
For the sake of clarity, I must emphasize my criticism isn't that this is an 
antiquated system that needs to be overhauled - if anything this is as good as it 
gets if Hume has it right. Instead, my 'criticism' is more of a lingering question 
that may never be settled, namely: How are we to properly evaluate selves on the 
individual and interpersonal level if everything we do is determined? 
A great Buddhist passage in line with my thinking reads something like: 
You say, 'He injured me, he insulted me, how terrible!' But this is writhing 
in delusion. Why so? ... It is delusion, first, because the self that insulted 
you has been partly superseded by a new concrete actuality, the other 
person now, which may be indefinitely different from the insulting self. It 
is delusion, second, because the insulted self has also been superseded. 
There is incomplete identity on both sides. But third, there is only 
incomplete non-identity between the two persons. The other's past has 
entered into your present being, your past into his, and both share a partly 
overlapping causal future. Each helps to create a new self in the other and 
will influence some of the same future selves. Finally, fourth, both you and 
the other, as individual animals, are passing phenomena, whose careers 
may cease at any time. 84 
84 Hartshorne, 206. 
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As you can see, this thinking challenges if not opposes the everyday 
assumptions involved in how we relate to and interact with those around us, and 
the judgements that we continually employ to do so. As an apt characterization of 
the determined self who cannot be known as enduring, if this has anything to 
teach us, it is that we must overcome our need to define one another - to limit 
someone to his or her revealed qualities for the sake of 'understanding' - because 
we will never properly understand. Seeming to recognize this, Hume claimed 
from these variations of temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding 
concerning the actions and resolutions of men, where there is any 
contrariety of motives and passions. ss 
* * * 
By way of a summary, Hume's theories of personal identity and free will 
lead to the conclusion that we are not justified in making binding judgements 
about another because: (1) self is always developing and, as such, there are 
innumerable perceptions that must factor into its adequate assessment. (2) Our 
evaluations must depend upon prevalent rather than abiding qualities; all we can 
scrutinize are words and actions, given that we are not mind-readers. And (3) as I 
see it, if a person's action is determined then he or she could not have done 
otherwise. As such, a person's motive cannot be evaluated along the lines of "S/he 
did x but could have done y." 
Is there hope for us yet? Does Hume's account of sympathy- of 'feeling 
with' the other - enable adequate judgement? Or does it simply leave us with 
85 Hume, 2.3.4.10. 
moral determinations - with a means for distinguishing between the good and 
the bad, but nowhere to go from there? I will now take up these questions in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Hume's theory of sympathy, its implications for moral 
judgement, and their possible reconciliation 
You shall no longer take things at second or third hand, nor 
Look through the eyes of the dead, nor feed on the spectres 
in books, 
You shall not look through my eyes either, nor take things 
from me, 
You shall listen to all sides and filter them from yourself. 
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- Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass 
As a moral sense theorist, Hume attempted to provide an alternative to 
both moral rationalism - which claimed that virtue and vice could be ascertained 
by reason alone - and the egoism of such philosophers as Thomas Hobbes, who 
theorized that one's self is (or should be) the motivation and the goal of all of 
one's actions. Bridging the divide between the objectivity of the rationalists and 
the extreme subjectivity of the egoists, Hume argued that moral judgements are 
grounded in feeling rather than reason, and lack any rational justification or 
foundation independent of the moral sense, 86 which is common to every human 
being. What this means is each of us possesses a moral faculty through which we 
detect good and bad moral qualities in people by virtue of how we feel about their 
actions and inferred motive. 87 
86 HlUlle, 3.1.1.26. 
88 Hume, 2.1.11.8. 
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It's worth emphasizing that this d,etection is an instinctive rather than a 
deliberative process, ss aptly likened to the manner in which our senses detect 
qualities in external objects, such as colours and shapes. Not to be understood as 
part of, or even associated with rationality, then, moral approval and disapproval 
are not rational judgements about conceptual relations and facts; they are 
emotional responses. 89 Hence, for any moral action we examine we will never find 
a fact that we call "virtue" or "vice. "go 
To further his point that morality is "more properly felt than judged of,"91 
Hurtle criticises the claim that we rationally jud,ge the fitness or unfitness of our 
actions with reference to eternal moral relations. A particularly striking example 
is in his use of arboreal parricide to show that a young tree that overgrows and 
kills its parent exhibits the same alleged relations as a human child killing his or 
her parent.92 Now, if morality is a question of relations, we are committed to 
saying that the young tree is immoral. This, of course, is absurd, and so 
undermines the theory that moral approval and disapproval are rational 
judgements about conceptual relations and facts. 
In keeping with this theme, for Hume there are four irreducible categories 
of qualities that exhaustively constitute moral virtue: (1) qualities useful to others, 
which include benevolence, meekness, charity, justice, fidelity and veracity; (2) 
s9 Hume, 2.2.1 0.8. 
90 Hume,3.1.2.11. 
91 Hume, 3.2.8.8. 
91 Hume, 3.1.2.1. 
92 Hume, 3.1.1.24. 
qualities useful to oneself, which include industry, perseverance, and patience; 
(3) qualities immediately agreeable to others, which include wit, eloquence and 
cleanliness; and (4) qualities immediately agreeable to oneself, which include 
good humour, self-esteem and pride.93 Interestingly enough, you'll notice the 
most morally significant actions seem to fall into more than one of these 
categories. 
50 
To be sure, Hume is not denying that there is instruction and incentive 
involved when it comes to perfonning a moral action. Rather, he intends only to 
advance the proposition that the fundamental characteristic of all our goods, 
whether natural, aesthetic or moral, is that they are immediately pleasing "as 
determined by the particular fabric and constitution of the human species. "94 This 
is to say the distinction between the good and the bad, taken in their widest 
scope, is founded on the pleasure and pain human beings universally experience, 
just by virtue of being human beings. Not to be understood in a hedonic sense, 
pleasures and pains are the efficient causes, not the objects or ends of actions. 
The way it plays out, Hume explains, is motives or character traits in the 
mind of the agent extends through his or her action and the social consequences 
of that action, and ends with sympathetic feelings of pleasure or pain in the mind 
of a spectator.9s Like "strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates 
93 Hume, 2.1.7-2.1.10. 
9s Hume, 3.2.8.8. 
95 Hume, 2.1.11.3. 
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itself to the rest, so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and 
beget correspondent movements in every human creature."96 
What Hume is suggesting here is that an agent's action is taken to be a sign 
of his or her quality of character, the instantiation of which produces pleasure or 
pain within a given spectator by virtue of the communicative principle, sympathy, 
which operates universally in human beings. Thus, without the connecting like of 
sympathy, it would seem that the spectator can never experience feelings of 
pleasure or pain with respect to an agent's action, can never morally approve or 
disapprove of it. 97 
Although it may be a universal principle in human nature, sympathy's 
mechanization varies with the closeness of relations, and so it is not always 
impartial.98 Our similarity as human beings allows a degree of sympathy to 
extend to everyone, but the extent to which it goes beyond this is "proportional to 
the operations of three associative principles,"99 Hume explains. Sympathy will 
more naturally extend to someone similar to oneself in a relevant way, but also to 
those related by contiguity and causation.100 This partiality best shows itself when 
you consider that we are naturally more affected by the plight of our friends and 
family than of strangers, say on the other side of the world.101 
96 Hume, 2.1.11.4. 
97 Hume, 2.1.11.5. 
98 Hume, 2.1.11. 7. 
99 Hume, 3.1.2.4. 
100 Hume, 3.1.2.5. 
If this was Hume's last word on the matter, we would be left asking, 
perhaps more expletively: How can Hume claim that a pri.nciple which 
contributes to a biased view of qualities of character is the foundation of 
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morality? Hume's response would be something like 'Sure, sympathy does play an 
important role in our moral judgements, however its partial determinations do 
not factor into the assessment of someone's character, at least not when moral 
judgement is properly carried out.'102 To ensure the integrity of our judgements, 
in addition to the degree to which we sympathize with another, we must also 
consider some relevant, steady, general points of view, Hume explains. For, 
every particular man has a peculiar position with regard to others; and 'tis 
impossible we could ever converse together on any reasonable terms, were 
each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear from his 
peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent those continual 
contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgement of things, we fix on 
some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place 
ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation.103 
It is with experience, then, that we begin to draw a distinction between 
changes due to a change of qualities in the agent we are considering, and changes 
due to our special situation or condition which is perhaps not shared by others. 
When it comes to moral judgements, we, hopefully, form the habit of looking 
upon a person's situation in such a way as to take into consideration only those 
characteristics that are independent of the special situation in which we find 
ourselves. Truly 'moral' judgements are therefore those that any human spectator 
will arrive at under the same circumstances. Pronouncing similar judgements on 
101 Hume, 3.1.2.5. 
102 Hume, 3.1.2.5. 
103 Hume, 3.2.7.11. 
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Hume's account of sympathy. Essentially, Kemp-Smith argues, Hume has 
substituted sympathy (i.e. our shared capacities and dispositions) later in the 
Treatise for the idea of 'enduring self he argued we could not have. In so doing, 
he has smuggled the idea of self back into his theory, just under another name.109 
So far is Hume from denying the existence of a continuing self, that ... he 
seeks the solution of his problems, both theoretical and moral, in that 
'human nature' - determinant of our perceptions, propensities, instincts, 
feelings and emotions - which is but the self under another name.110 
This is not only uncharitable it is also inaccurate, according to Don Garrett. 
He explains: In Book I of the Treatise Hume has simply denied the existence of 
an impression of self as something simple and individual that remains constant 
and invariable, from which the idea of an enduring self could be derived.111 Even 
though there is no impression corresponding to a substantial self, there may still 
be "impressions of ourselves of some other kind, corresponding to the true idea of 
the human mind as a bundle of related perceptions. "112 This paves the way for a 
distinction between a 'sympathetic self and an 'enduring self. Unlike the 
enduring self from earlier in the Treatise, Garrett explains, the sympathetic self is 
simply our impressions or memories of ourselves that enable the mental 
mechanism of sympathy to be triggered.113 
109 Kemp-Smith, Norman, The philosophy of David Hume (New York: Garland Pub., 
1983), 556. 
no Kemp-Smith, 98. 
111 Garrett, 341. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Garrett, 343. 
similar actions, whether the agent is one's friend, enemy, neighbour or foreign 
inhabitant, is how we ensure impartiality, then. 
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This leads me to a point of contention raised by Terence Penelhum. He 
questions: If to sympathise with another is to be affected by his or her emotional 
experience such that I experience a parallel emotional state, isn't the idea of self 
essential to this process?104 Penelhum believes that it is when he argues that 
sympathy is evoked because the idea I have of another is enlivened until it has the 
vivacity of an impression.105 Emotional contagion is therefore rooted in a person's 
capacity to understand that other people experience similar emotions and have 
similar views to oneself.to6 Thus, to sympathize, one must have both an idea of 
self and other. 
Does Hume concede the point when he says, "'[t]is evident, that the idea ... 
of ourselves is always intimately present with us ...• Whatever object, therefore, is 
related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception ...• 107"? 
This may strike you as contradictory, considering Hume's earlier contention that 
we have no fixed idea of self (where "self' is taken to be the totality of a person's 
conscious existence).ws 
Norman Kemp-Smith takes the denial in Book I that we can have an 
impression and resultant idea of the 'self as enduring to be incompatible with 
104 Penelhum, 87. 
105 Penelhum, 87. 
106 Penelhum, 87. 
107 Hume, 2.1.11.4. 
108 Hume, 1.4.6.2. 
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What does Penelhum make of this? Although he thinks Hume has not been 
careful enough with his wording so as to rule out ambiguity and inconsistency 
entirely, he nevertheless agrees with Garrett that Hume's theories in Book II do 
not commit him to the denial of what he has said in Book !.114 What Hume needs 
in Book II, says Penelhum, is to be able to use the idea of oneself as distinct from 
others. In other words, he needs mere individuation.115 
I agree with Penelhum and Garret, but in slightly different terms. I believe 
all that Hume needs in his account of sympathy is that at any particular time, 
when we are conscious, there should be a complex impression we can identify as 
the impression of our own person. This impression need not remain unchanging, 
enabling the idea of enduring self, but simply lend itself at all times during our 
conscious existence to represent the title "self, or that individual person, of whose 
actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious. "n6 
Rather than assume too much, let me conclude this issue by saying: 
Because Hume has not been explicit about the idea of self required for sympathy 
and it is uncharitable to accuse him of overlooking a glaring inconsistency 
between the books of his Treatise, I think his uses of 'self in the later books 
would most properly be regarded as ambiguities and the interpretation most 
consistent with the books of the Treatise likely preserves his intended meaning. 
114 Penelhum, 87. 
115 Penelhum, 87. 
116 Hume, 1.4.6.6. 
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Ambiguities aside, what really concerns me is settling the question of 
whether we are justified in making binding judgements by virtue of sympathy and 
after having arrived at an impartial perspective. First, I must remind you of a key 
point raised in the previous chapter, specifically Hume's contention that selves 
are subject to change one moment to the next. Why am I reminding you of this? 
Because I want to examine "self' in the light of its instantiation more fully and 
thereafter determine how we are to judge a particular selfs unfolding by 
appealing to sympathy. 
A good place to begin this section is with Hume's methodology with 
respect to evaluation. For Hume, we are never to consider any single action in our 
inquiries concerning the origin of morals, but only the quality of character from 
which the action proceeded. This is because a single action, considered in 
isolation, is not closely enough related to the person responsible for it, unless, of 
course, it is a legitimate sign of a motive or quality of character in him or her. 
Interestingly enough, his reason for holding this view is not that it is the motive, 
occurring in consciousness as a desire or a passion, that we either approve of or 
sympathize with, but rather that the quality of character from which the action 
proceeded must be durable enough to affect our sentiments concerning the 
person.117 
Yes, the motive gives us information about the character of the person; 
however, the object of the approval or disapproval is not a motive but a person. It 
117 Hume, 2.3.2.6. 
57 
follows that incidental or uncharacteristic actions do not determine our love or 
hatred, approval or disapproval of a particular person. 
A point of interest I must draw your attention to is that durability of 
character seems very much like endurance of character, in that it suggests there is 
something of the past that remains, bridging the transition from one state to the 
next. us Now, which qualities remain unchanged and which qualities undergo 
change, as well as their respective implications for the stability or enduringness of 
one's character, are not always clear, not only to others, but also to oneself. 
Fortunately, Derek Parfit has proposed an interesting way to deal with this 
dichotomy. 
For Parfit, the distinction between successive selves can be made by 
reference not to the branching of psychological continuity, but to the degrees of 
psychological connectedness.119 Unlike psychological continuity, psychological 
connectedness admits of degree, and so the drawing of distinctions can be left to 
the choice of the speaker and may justifiably vary from one context to another .120 
Accordingly, the word "I" can be used to imply the greatest degree of 
psychological connectedness. And when connections are reduced - when there 
has been any marked change of character or style oflife, or any marked loss of 
memory - Parfit suggests we could say, "It was not I who did that, but an earlier 
us You may remember that this was an argument raised by JaneL. Mcintyre that I examined in the 
~revious chapter but in a different, and in my opinion, more fitting context. 
19 Parfit, Derek A, "On the Importance of Self-Identity," in The Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 68, Oct., 
1971), 689. 
120 Parfit, 689. 
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self." In addition, we could describe in what ways and to what degree we are 
related to this earlier self. 'He' explains, 
[i]f I say, 'It will not be me, but one of my future selves,' I do not imply that 
I will be that future self. He is one of my later selves, and I am one of his 
earlier selves. There is no underlying person who we both are ..•. The 
question 'Are X andY the same person?' thus becomes 'Is X at least an 
ancestral (or descendent) self ofY?'t2t 
Giving credit where it is due, this does help to make the implications of 
Hume's theory of self more applicable and perhaps more appealing, inasmuch as 
it makes plausible the notion that we can still talk about selves even if they are not 
psychologically continuous. However, it does not help us to settle the question of 
whether we are justified in judging selves to be representative of "self,'' only how 
we are to think and talk about them. We must therefore look elsewhere on that 
head. I suspect the Enquiry might help us out. Therein, Hume tells us that 
we must be acquainted beforehand with all the objects, and all their 
relations to each other; and from a comparison of the whole, fix our choice 
or approbation ...• If any material circumstances be yet unknown or 
doubtful, we must first employ our inquiry or intellectual faculties to 
assure us of it; and must suspend for a time all moral decision or 
sentiment.122 
What I take from this is even though we cannot be wrong about whether 
the view of a particular characteristic or quality gives rise to pleasure or pain, it 
does not mean we cannot go wrong in our judgements of the subjective qualities 
of selves. 
121 Parfit, 689. 
122 Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. with intro. J.B. Schneewind 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1983), 290. 
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Indeed, says Hume, particular judgements can go wrong in a number of 
ways. (1) We can misinterpret a given situation and fail to see that it is one 
indicative of a certain quality in a person. (2) We can fail to be properly affected 
by a quality in a person due to mistaken beliefs or to psychological deficiencies. 
And (3) we can fail to achieve impartiality in our assessments, such as overrating 
a friend's virtue or an enemy's vice.l23 
In all of these ways it is important to remember that the assessment of a 
person's virtues or vices is faulty because it is not based on a moral sentiment, but 
is instead misinformed and/ or partial. With that, the respective judgement that 
we make would not be a moral judgement because it is bound to be inaccurate 
and misrepresentative. 
That said, for Hume moral judgements are not subjective and relative. 
Sure, the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation vary from person to 
person and situation to situation. However, in our judgements we try to arrive at 
stable and intersubjectively shared opinions of the qualities and persons we judge 
- an ideal equal sympathy (a complete disinterestedness) toward all persons 
regardless of time and place. As disinterested, each of us experiences the same 
degree of sympathy with all other persons. As fully informed we all consider the 
same conditions and consequences. Mistakes in "moral" judgements are therefore 
due to mistakes concerning matters of fact. 
123 Hume, Treatise, 3.1.1.21-22. 
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It is only when we see things - including our own perspectives - correctly, 
and judge on the basis of our moral sentiments, after having corrected for 
variations due to our particular situations, that our moral judgements cannot be 
mistaken. And what underlies this, Hume believes, is that every normal person's 
mental faculties are alike, insofar as through them we can each arrive at the same 
moral stance.124 
It is difficult to say what follows from this. On one reading, Hume does not 
deny an objective foundation of morality. His notions of common agreement and 
impartiality (grounded in instinct) assure us that a spectator's moral approval is 
not unique to him or her. Yet, on another reading, it seems Hume does deny an 
objective foundation of morality. 
James Fieser takes the latter interpretation in suggesting a spectator's 
approval (although not unique to him or her) is still dependent upon the 
possession of certain human instincts.which assure impartiality and common 
agreement. It follows mores and norms that are relative to a particular culture or 
society are going to be looked on differently. Moreover, Fieser adds, the very 
existence and nature of instinctive moral standards is a contingent matter, so it 
would seem strange to call such instincts "objective."125 
True, a crucial part of what gives Hume's moral standards their objectivity 
is their instinctive ease and universal grounding in common sentiment, but that is 
not the whole of it. The moral point of view is inherently social and it involves 
124 Hume, ECPM, 80. 
125 Fieser, James, "Is Hume a Moral Skeptic?" in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 50, No.1 (pp. 89-105), September, 1989, 104. 
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perceptual correction. In this respect, it is completely analogous to any 'general' 
point of view. Granted, the point of view must call into operation at least one 
sentiment common to all (normal) persons, otherwise it would not succeed in 
bringing everyone's judgements into agreement.126 However, lack of common 
agreement does not imply that there is no objective foundation for moral 
judgement; rather, it implies that not everyone has made a 'moral' judgement. 
Remember, for Hume, it is only through overleaping the bounds of our own 
individuality that a moral judgement is possible. 
This is the most charitable interpretation of Hume, according to James 
Baillie. It allows for a satisfactory compromise between, on the one hand, 
simplistic forms of subjectivism, which identify moral judgements with initial 
emotional responses, leading to a relativism in which no standard of adjudication 
is possible, and in which there is no difference between being morally right and 
seeming that way to X or Y.127 And, on the other hand, it is not an extreme view 
entailing the metaphysical excess of theories asserting the existence of facts 
pertaining to moral properties holding independently of all possible human 
cognition or sensibility.128 
Seyla Benhabib would agree with this merit of Hume's account. In her 
article, "Judgement and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Hannah Arendt's 
126 Rawls, John, Lecture on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 88-89. 
127 Baillie, Jantes, Hume on Morality (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 197. 
128 Baillie, 197. 
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Thought," she argues our perspectives are symmetrical and reversible.129 What 
she means by this is people are able to adopt one another's perspectives because 
we are all similar; we are all able to see ourselves "reflected in other people and 
find that they see themselves reflected in us. "13° Characterizing moral judgements 
in this way, she adapts Hannah Arendt's version of Kant's "enlarged thought. "131 
According to Arendt, when a person makes a moral-political judgement 
she consults with her common sense in order to distance herself from private 
interests, so as to achieve a generality, or universality of outcome. By "going 
visiting" or "thinking with''132 another, a person essentially judges as a member of 
a community rather than as a self-interested individual. Through this process she 
better informs her own standpoint - determines whether something experienced 
as pleasant or displeasing is likely to be viewed similarly by others in the same 
situation.133 By putting oneself in thought in the place of others, then, one can 
achieve a community-informed standpoint. 
Although nice in theory, we can only ever achieve relative impartiality, 
Lisa Disch argues. Even if a person considers the possible judgements of others, 
she will ultimately come to her own conclusions, which have their basis in what 
she takes to be another's interests and concerns and are made with reference to 
no Benhabib, Seyla, "Judgement and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Hannah Arendt's Thought," in 
Situating the Self: gender, communitv. and postmodemism in contemporary ethics (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1992), 124, 305. 
m Benhabib, 305. 
131 1bid. 
m Arendt, Hannah, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. & interpretive essay Ronald Beiner 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 74. 
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our own. What she achieves, then, is "impartiality which is not neutrality," a 
"situated impartiality."t34 
As I see it, this is precisely where Hume's theory would leave us. I say this 
for several reasons, but mostly because one cannot, on Hume's account, form the 
idea of another person's emotion unless one has had the corresponding 
impression. This follows from the claim that the passions are simple impressions 
and that all simple ideas are copies of simple impressions. Thus, one can 
sympathize only with experiences that one has had himself. In other words, 
sympathy's operation therefore depends upon relations and varies with the 
closeness of relations. 
Hume himself points this out when he tells us that we sympathize more 
with those closely related to us than with strangers. Of course, he also emphasizes 
that these relations are supposed to be irrelevant when we evaluate people's 
actions and characters. So, a simple appeal to humankind's sympathetic nature 
can hardly suffice to explain evaluation for Hume. Yet, undeniably, the objectivity 
that this non-partial evaluation requires depends ultimately upon comparison -
that of my situation in particular or of a human being generally. I know of no 
other measure. 
Iris Marion Young agrees, arguing that this method of evaluation, instead 
of giving us a more objective standpoint, requires and reinforces the assumption 
that all subjects are similar13s; and this is not the case. We each have our own 
m Disch, Lisa, "More Truth Than Fact," in Political Theory (Vol. 21, Nov., 1993), 672. 
136 Young, Iris Marion, "Asymmetrical Reciprocity," in Intersecting Voices: dilemmas of gender. political 
philosophy, and policy (Princeton, N.J.: University Press, 1997), 44. 
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unique life-stories, emotional habits and values, and, because of this, our 
positions are unique and irreversible.t36 
To be fair to Hume, his moral theory does enable the generation of some 
intersubjectively shared viewpoints and moral determinations, and for this to 
occur there must be an underlying sentiment involved that is common to us all. 
My concern is that although these viewpoints may be acceptable, they may not be 
satisfactory and meaningful. Perhaps too cynically, I suspect that something we 
could all agree upon - a situation we could all see similarly - would be rather 
trivial and arbitrary, a truism that need not be considered in the first place. 
Oftentimes we conceive the problem of moral agency to be a problem of 
getting from the subjective to the objective, of gaining a clearer, better, impartial 
view of ourselves, our friends, and our actions.137 We seek authority for our 
judgements, rather than simply settling for "well this is how it seems to me." But 
what we must consider is that the struggle for objectivity is followed by another, 
perhaps more difficult, challenge: that we not lose our subjectivity in our quest for 
justification. Ironically, I add, this position is informed by the Humean claim that 
we cannot own our actions unless we can make judgements not only about 
ourselves and our place in society and the world, but also the similarities and 
differences between our situation and the situations of others. Where I clearly 
diverge from Hume is in my thinking that it is only through considered 
m Young, 39. 
137 Tirrell, Lynne, "Storytelling and Moral Agency," in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (Vol. 
48, No.2, Spring, 1990), 124. 
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judgement afforded by discourse that our decisions and actions can be informed 
by human standards and in human terms, and with reference to particular human 
interests. 
This is reminiscent of the view held by contemporary moral and political 
philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, who believes the best way to achieve a 
community informed standpoint is to bring our interests to the table by 
communicating them to others.138 Because we are not mind· readers, Habermas 
explains, in order to arrive at any kind of shared understanding we must 
communicate our concerns, perspectives and interests to one another. Of course, 
ideas are not simply thrown out at random with the hope that something will 
catch on; there are specific epistemic rules as to how discourse should be carried 
out. Although these rules are outlined and detailed for us by Habermas, he says 
that they are based on our intuitive know .. how in competent argumentation.139 So 
it seems that our understanding of them is first aroused by reflecting on 
argumentation, and they actually make discourse morality possible in the first 
place. As such, they are not transcendental or a priori conditions of possibility. 
Whether implicitly or explicitly, every speech act makes three universal 
validity claims, according to Habermas. (1) A claim to the truth of what is said or 
assumed, (2) a claim to the "rightness" of what's being said in a given context and 
(3) a claim to the speaker's truthfulness.14° Hence, everyday linguistic interchange 
139 Habermas, Jurgen, Truth and Justification, ed. & trans. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 
2003), 247. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Habermas, 247. 
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is a process of raising and recognizing validity claims.14 1 However, it gets more 
sophisticated when it comes to discourse on morality, given that it requires some 
idealizing suppositions, such as: participants must be motivated only by the force 
of the better argument, all competent parties are entitled to participate on equal 
terms in discussion, and no relevant argument is to be suppressed or excluded.142 
Argued thus, I suspect Habermas, like Hume, thinks that the goal of 
universalization is impartiality.143 It is in arguing that a person's particular, 
relevant interests should factor into moral determinations, and that the adequacy 
of these determinations can only be ensured by argumentation actually being 
carried out amongst all concerned (rather than just in one's head), that Habermas 
clearly sets himself apart from Hume in particular and the Modernist tradition 
generally. With that, Habermas's philosophy carries the differing upshot that 
through discourse morality he intends to give us moral claims that are justified 
and validated by a procedure that is not only impartial, but also satisfactory to all 
rational agents concerned. 
While I like the communicative model Habermas has proposed and think it 
does much heavy lifting in affording the generation of valid claims, it seems to 
reduce the claims to something cut and dry. I say this because for Habermas 
when we have a contested claim we appeal to discourse in order to seek rational 
and satisfactory agreement on it. So, in the end, the contested norm cannot be 
142 Habermas, 255. 
143 Ibid. 
143 Of course, he uses a different method to achieve this end, and has different considerations of 
what kinds of interests and inclinations should factor into our determinations. 
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more or less right or valid; it's either right or wrong - we either agree or disagree, 
and ideally we agree. In theory this seems like a good method because it is in 
everybody's best interests and through it we can generate more meaningful moral 
claims. But, practically speaking, it seems quite unfeasible and unrealistic to 
assume that we could ever come together and discourse in this way.144 
Even if we grant it feasible, it would seem that the moral claims we could 
actually generate through this method would be trivial at best. On my reading of 
Habermas, you cannot bring conflicting values to the table because (1) you will 
not get an outcome that has universallegitimacy145 and (2) where the process of 
discourse morality seems to be that of a give and take in coming to an 
understanding of and agreement on the overall best interests of those concerned, 
it seems plausible to assume that at least one person would have to compromise 
(if not sacrifice) their claim in order to achieve such agreement. Thus, though 
seemingly extending the sphere of what is to count as a legitimate and meaningful 
moral claim, I believe that Habermas actually makes it as limited if not more 
limited than Hume. 
Furthermore, "moral views vary not only from one society to another but 
also from one individual to another in the same society."146 Like Hume tells us, 
our actual sympathies are not only highly variable they are also highly partial and 
largely influenced by our affinities to persons near to us in space and time, similar 
144 I recognize this is not of concern for Habermas, because he is not trying to convince anyone 
that they should adopt this system. 
146 Habennas, Jurgen, The Postnational Constellation: Political essays, ed. & trans. Max Pensky 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2001), 125. 
146 Mackie, J.L., Hume's Moral Theory, ed. Ted Honderich (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 67. 
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to us in language and culture and in shared interests and family ties. 147 Outside a 
small circle of family and friends, it seems unlikely that anyone will share the 
same concerns with anyone else. 
What this suggests is that although the feelings of doing the right or wrong 
thing may be universal to all humans, cultures differ very much on what they 
define as right and wrong. As a consequence, moral principles are, in my opinion, 
only provisionally true, where they apply to most people, in most cultures, in 
most circumstances, most of the time. 
Granted, with Habermas our interests are more "out there" than they are 
with Hume by virtue of their actually being lain on the table. However, what we 
could come to agree upon, given our unique interests and values, seems to me like 
it would be quite limited and trivial at best. Thus, I take issue with whether the 
claims we could actually generate through Habermas's discourse morality would 
prove satisfactory. From what has just been said, my conclusion is, quite simply: 
I think not. 
But I intend to do more than critique, I want also to prescribe. What I 
think is needed is something that neither Habermas nor Hume's theories afford, a 
way to distinguish between the background and the context of a claim when it 
comes to making moral pronouncements. 
In my opinion, there are contingent aspects that affect our analysis in 
every situation and we must therefore factor in individual idiosyncrasies, not to 
147 Hume, 2.1.11.5. 
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arrive at a consensus - reducing or holding the individual to the collective 
standard - but to arrive at an understanding first and foremost. Background and 
context increase understanding inasmuch as the background helps to explain 
moral behaviour by taking account of individual idiosyncrasies and the context 
helps to properly assess the behaviour by enabling us to better relate to the 
particular agent given his differences from and similarities to us. 
True, typically in judging an act we don't judge the entire background that 
contributes to the agent's lifestyle, but rather a particular act he performs. A.S. 
Cua argues that if "in order to judge the actions of a man, we must understand the 
system of meaning and reference that constitutes that world in which he 
dwells, "148 no moral judgement would be possible, since every judgement would 
require an understanding of another's total existence.149 This is based on the 
assumption that attempting to understand an act before we judge it would make 
our judgement impossible because we are required to understand the whole 
system of social, cultural and political beliefs that informed the action. 
I agree that if we emphasized understanding alone when making moral 
judgements it would render them obsolete and completely unfeasible, but this 
emphasis is undue. Judgement and understanding must go hand-in-hand, 
receiving equal emphasis, for our judgements to be legitimate; for how can you 
rely on a moral judgement's accuracy if you do not truly understand the character 
of the moral agent in question? A judgement that does not require a 
148 Cua, A.S., "Moral Judgement and Understanding," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Vol. 
30, No.4, Jun., 1970), 615. 
149 Ibid. 
comprehensive understanding is both possible and efficient, but it cannot 
necessarily be said to be adequate because it is likely uninformed and 
misrepresentative. 
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Chapters: Conclusion 
Stated directly, the focus of this thesis has been David Hume's theory of 
personal identity found in the Treatise of Human Nature. Watering it down with 
the hope that its intended meaning has already been adequately conveyed and 
preserved throughout, let me briefly reiterate by saying Hume's theory began with 
and built upon the assumption that humans are sentient beings whose knowledge 
is arrived at through sense impressions. How we understand ourselves and the 
world around us is therefore subject to change by virtue of the impressions we 
experience. If an accurate characterization, given that our impressions are many 
and varying, we cannot have one single impression and one derivative idea that 
constitutes a corpus of knowledge in any capacity, least of all when it comes to 
personal identity which, according to Hume, requires invariance. 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, Terence Penelhum, Jane L. Mcintyre and 
Barry Stroud each take issue with this theory. Specifically, Penelhum focused on 
the sharp distinction Hume drew between identity and difference, arguing 
"change" should be understood as relative to the kind of thing we are talking 
about. When it comes to "self' or "personal identity" we should understand them 
as allowing for and accommodating many changes, he argued, and, as such, they 
can endure through time. 
While interesting and appealing, insofar as it speaks to our common 
intuitions about change and the nature of self, I argued that Penelhum has not 
engaged with Hume's argument. What Hume has denied is the possibility of any 
impression of a self remaining uniformly identical and underlying our various 
interrupted and changing experiences. Subject to argument, then, is the claim 
that remaining the same person throughout our lives cannot be derived from an 
impression of self. Penelhum says nothing in the way of this. 
His argument lost even more force given that his loose definition of self 
and Hume's strict one would leave us in the exact same predicament when it 
comes to knowing selves, and this is what Penelhum's project attempted to 
address and improve upon. 
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Mcintyre, you'll remember, argued that Hume's theory of personal identity 
presupposes and requires the very idea of enduring self he attempted to disprove. 
By presenting us with a self that is affected by experience, Hume needs to explain 
how an immaterial self that doesn't endure can be affected, even if only insofar as 
something of the past must carry over into the present, enabling a transition from 
one state to the other to occur, Mcintyre contends. 
It struck me that Mcintyre took Hume's proposition about self-knowledge 
to have implications for the existence of self. Accordingly, I argued: Hume's claim 
that we cannot have an idea or knowledge of ourselves as enduring the same 
through time is independent of and does not entail the further claim that self 
cannot endure in some way. What it does entail is that consistency is not a part of 
selfs essential nature, and, as such, a strict notion of personal identity does not 
apply to selves. And this says little about the possible abidingness of selves, and 
much in the way of our inability to know anything about the self beyond our 
perceptions. This led me to conclude that Hume does not require an idea of an 
enduring self to support his theory that we cannot have an idea of an enduring 
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self. All he needs is to make plausible the idea that an accurate understanding of 
"self' must account for many more or less consistent and related perceptions. 
Barry Stroud paralleled Mcintyre's reasoning when he suggested Hume's 
theory reduces "mind" to something fictitious. Essentially, he questioned: If the 
mind or imagination is nothing but a bundle of perceptions and it is possible to 
recognize this, what does the recognizing? Responding with the 'mind' or 
'imagination' doesn't help us, he reasoned, because there is no such thing; there is 
only a bundle of perceptions. 
The source of Stroud's problem, I indicated, was in equating 'we have a 
mistaken belief in what constitutes mind' with 'if the mind is a bundle of 
per2eptions, then the mind itself is illusory.' Thus, Stroud has failed to distinguish 
between our belief in the integrity of the concept "mind" and the nature of mind 
itself. 
I was, and still am, quite confident in thinking Hume doesn't mean to 
imply that the mind is illusory, but rather the simpler and less contentious 
proposition that we have a mistaken understanding of its nature. I supported this 
interpretation by arguing that it isn't necessary for an abstract idea representing a 
class of things with a common quality to be preceded by an impression that is the 
separate and distinct impression of that quality.15° Yes, it seems odd to say 'a 
bundle of perceptions - the mind - confuses certain sequences of perceptions 
with others in misunderstanding its own nature. But this is an issue of parlance 
rather than truth value. 
150 Garrett, 342. 
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The major concern that I expressed in this chapter was (1) if Hume is 
correct in claiming our belief in identity is defective in meaning and can be 
suppressed, and (2) if we consider that the judgements we make are often binding 
and presuppose a self that endures, then (3) the practice of judging human beings 
is likely inadequate and our judgements misrepresentative, given that (4) our 
judgement would refer to something "real" but to the real as unspecified, 
considering the person under scrutiny is, strictly speaking, constantly changing to 
appearance and understanding. 
True, character is expressed in a person's actions. But this is a minor and 
inconsequential concession given that each new act creates a partly new 
character, and character as already formed implies only a certain range of 
probabilities and possibilities for action. Considering judgement is, primarily, an 
attempt to define and limit something for the sake of understanding and Humean 
selves are always changing, judging one another would be inconclusive and would 
lose its significance entirely. Thus, legitimation of judgement was not afforded by 
Hume's theory of personal identity alone. 
Looking elsewhere for judgement's legitimation, with the help of William 
R. Carter, Harry Frankfurt, Richard Taylor, Peter van Inwagen and Randolph 
Clarke, Chapter 3 examined Book II of the Treatise and the Enquiry Concerning 
the Principles .of Morals wherein Hume's moral theory was expounded. I quickly 
discovered that Hume's theory of free will has major implications for moral 
actions, responsibility and judgements. 
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William R. Carter, Peter van Inwagen, Richard Taylor and Randolph 
Clarke each focused on the implications Hume's theory has for deliberation. 
Holding the minority opinion, Clarke believed it is the absence of beliefs about 
inabilities that is necessary for deliberation, not the positive belief in freedom, in 
genuine alternatives, proposed by the others. 
Although sympathetic to Clarke's view, my own view was informed by and 
closely aligned with that of William James. Like James, I argued that an agent 
may consistently believe that the causal chain determining his action includes 
deliberation and that deliberation can be effective in contributing to determining 
his action. The consistency of this position relies on the proposition that 
regardless of whether the universe is determined, the fact that the future is 
unknown and that a person's actions help to determine that future remain. 
After much deliberation, I moved on to questioning where exactly Hume's 
account of freedom leaves us with respect to moral responsibility and evaluation. 
Beginning by drawing an important distinction between the liberty of 
indifference (negation of necessity and causes) and the liberty of spontaneity 
(that which is opposed to force), Hume attempted to show that the common 
conception of freedom (indifference) actually undermined traditional ethics and 
that his theory (spontaneity) would safeguard it. 
That which isn't subject to necessity and causality is random or chance, 
Hume explained. A random human action does not follow from a person's 
character and, as such, does not carry any moral weight or meaning. Thus, any 
meaningful instantiation of freedom requires determinism. 
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Nevertheless, Hume believed that the degree of constraint involved in a 
person's actions certainly has implications for his or her moral responsibility. As I 
indicated, he was careful to point out that determinism is not to be understood as 
akin to or even associated with coercion, but rather necessity. Unlike coercion, 
necessity doesn't entail a total loss of freedom or control, but rather that there are 
limitations to our freedom. Surprisingly, this, instead of absolving us from moral 
responsibility and evaluation, actually enables its proper attribution, Hume 
contended. That is because any judgement of moral responsibility must 
presuppose the causal relation between motive and action, because we do not 
blame human beings for particular actions they perform, but for the qualities of 
character that motivated the action. Moreover, Hume explained, we constantly 
assume human behaviour is part of the causal nexus and is subject to change by 
virtue of rewards and punishments. 
In short, Hume's theorized: Because it includes human behaviour as part 
of the causal chain and connects an individual's actions to his or her character, 
determinism allows for the proper attribution of rewards and punishments, and 
therefore safeguards ethics. 
Groundwork in place, I moved on to tie in the previous chapter. Supposing 
our knowledge of others can only ever be approximate and all of our actions are 
determined, as we find in Hume, I questioned whether we can ever be justified in 
speculating as to what a person might have done in a given situation. The reason I 
raised this was because, typically, we attempt to understand an action by tracing 
it back to its agent's antecedent motive, with the intention of figuring out what 
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might have been from the possibilities afforded by the situation and thereafter 
evaluate the motive and action accordingly. But if a person's action is determined, 
I reasoned, there are no possibilities for action, there is only the realization of the 
actual. Because it is realizing one possibility over another that makes one worthy 
of commendation or censure, in only giving us actuality - i.e. that which is 
determined by the satisfaction of antecedent conditions beyond one's ultimate 
control - I concluded that Hume's theory does not give us an adequate basis for 
moral evaluation after all. 
When coupled with what was advanced in Chapter 2, then, I found that 
Hume's theories of personal identity and free will lead to the conclusion that we 
are not justified in judging one another because: (1) Self is always developing, so 
there are innumerable perceptions that must factor into its adequate assessment. 
(2) Our evaluations must depend upon prevalent rather than abiding qualities; all 
we can scrutinize are words and actions, given that we are not mind-readers. And 
(3) if a person's action was determined then he or she could not have done 
otherwise. Accordingly, a person's action cannot be evaluated along the lines of 
"S/he did x but could have done y." 
I began Chapter 4 by explaining another important aspect of Hume's moral 
theory, his claim that moral judgements are grounded in feeling rather than 
reason and lack any rational justification or foundation independent of the moral 
sense. More specifically, moral judgements are grounded in the sympathetic 
emotional responses of pleasure and pain, which enliven the idea we have of 
another to the point where it is much like the vivacity of an impression; 
thereafter, our judgements are refined by taking account of some general and 
stable points of view. 
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This was a point of contention for Norman Kemp-Smith and Don Garrett, 
who questioned whether Hume's theory of sympathy requires the idea of 
enduring self he denied in Book I. Kemp-Smith argued that Hume essentially 
substituted our shared capacities and dispositions {sympathy) later in the 
Treatise for the idea of 'enduring self he argued we could not have. Garrett 
disagreed, asserting the 'sympathetic self Hume speaks of is not to be equated 
with the 'enduring self from earlier in the Treatise. The 'sympathetic self is 
simply the impressions or memories of ourselves that enable the mental 
mechanism of sympathy to be triggered. Not unlike Garrett, I argued all Hume 
needs in his account of sympathy is that at any particular time when we are 
conscious there should be a complex impression we can identify as the 
impression of our own person. This impression need not remain unchanging, 
serving as the foundation for the idea of enduring self, but simply lend itself at all 
times during our conscious existence to represent the title "self'. 
What this chapter was most concerned with, however, was settling the 
culmination of questions I had raised throughout the thesis, namely: Are we 
justified in making binding judgements about another's quality of character by 
virtue of sympathy and after having arrived at an impartial perspective? For 
Hume, the answer was yes. After having corrected for variations due to our 
particular situations, he explained, every normal person can arrive at the same 
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moral stance, justifying our moral judgements when this process is properly 
carried out. 
We found agreement in the philosophies of Seyla Benhabib and Hannah 
Arendt, who claimed that moral judgement is properly carried out when a person 
consults with her common sense, essentially distancing herself from private 
interests and thereby achieving a generality or universality of outcome. In so 
doing, a person judges as a member of a community rather than a self-interested 
individual. 
Not universally agreed upon, Lisa Disch thought this was nice in theory, 
but held that at the end of the day we can only ever achieve relative impartiality. 
Ultimate, we draw our own conclusions from our consideration of the possible 
judgements of others; thus, this process has its basis in what we take to be 
another's interests and concerns. What we achieve, then, is impartiality which is 
not neutrality - a situated impartiality. 
This criticism is further supported by Iris Marion Young who asserted that 
this method of evaluation, instead of giving us a more objective standpoint, 
requires and reinforces the assumption that all subjects are similar.l51 But this is 
not so. We each have our own unique life-stories, emotional habits and values, 
and, because of this, our positions are unique and irreversible. 
And this is precisely what I think Hume's theory leaves us with. Rather 
bold and unsubstantiated until I explained this thinking follows from Hume's 
151 Although relevant and helpful, I should mention it was not directed at Hume's philosophy in particular 
but rather the moral stance generally. 
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own theory of ideas. If, as Hume held, the passions are simple impressions and all 
simple ideas are copies of simple impressions, I cannot form the idea of another 
person's emotion and sympathize with him or her unless I have first had the 
corresponding impression. I can therefore only sympathize with experiences I've 
had myself. Of course, I added the rider that sympathy's partiality is not supposed 
to factor into our moral judgements, so a simple appeal to humankind's 
sympathetic nature can hardly suffice to explain evaluation for Hume. But this 
does not take away from the fact that ultimately the objectivity that this non-
partial evaluation requires depends upon comparison - that of my situation in 
particular or of a human being generally. The moral point of view must call into 
operation at least one sentiment common to all (normal) persons, otherwise it 
would not succeed in bringing everyone's judgements into agreement. 
Equally cynical and realistic, this exposed my assumption that a situation 
we could all see similarly and agree upon would be rather trivial and arbitrary - a 
truism that need not be considered in the first place. 
A further divergence from Hume is in my thinking that a moral stance can 
only be arrived at through discourse by virtue of our decisions and actions being 
informed by human standards in human terms, and with reference to particular 
human interests. In this way we may arrive at moral claims that are justified and 
validated by a procedure that is not only impartial, but also satisfactory to all 
rational agents concerned. This position, though largely informed by the 
philosophy of Jurgen Habermas, is importantly different. 
81 
Giving credit where it is due, a method like Habermas's is appealing, 
discourse morality serving as a platform through which we can communicate our 
interests and values, not our entire histories, just what is relevant to the 
discussion at hand and meaningful for us to acknowledge and preserve. However, 
left to its own devices, it reduces mores and norms to something cut and dry. 
Agreement would be on trivialities (not values) or it would be a matter of 
compromise, which defeats the purpose of coming to the table in the first place. 
Further, I argued, while the feelings of pleasure and pain may be universal 
to all humans, cultures differ very much on what they define as right and wrong. 
As a consequence, I believe moral principles are only provisionally true, where 
they apply to most people, in most cultures, in most circumstances, most of the 
time. 
Argued thus, when considered in isolation, Hume's theories lead to the 
conclusion that selves can only ever be described, not adequately judged. The 
information we garner about another through Hume's sympathy and the moral 
stance is an inadequate b&sis for understanding and judgement. Such inward 
activity ultimately has its basis in our perceptions of another, assumes that you or 
I can know what it is like to be that person by virtue of having had similar 
experiences that suffice to call sympathy into operation. Finally, supposing our 
knowledge of an individual's nature can only ever be approximate and our 
judgements vague, such that "Jane may be x type of person, but in a moment she 
may be another," the nature of Humean selves must necessarily elude 
comprehensive understanding and judgement. 
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With the addition of Iris Marion Young's theory of asymmetrical 
reciprocity, however, we can allow for Burne's theory of self and for us to 
appreciate that very "self," even with its many facades and complexities. Because 
there are contingent aspects that affect our analysis in every situation, we must 
fa~tor in individual idiosyncrasies to arrive at any kind of understanding and 
moral stance. By coming to know a person's character through its background 
history and thereafter framing it within its proper context, we can come to 
genuinely appreciate and evaluate a person's perspective and the actions it 
informs, but, I emphasize, only by reference to his or her revealed past. What we 
are left with, then, are not judgements, but rather informed descriptions. 
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